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I. INTRODUCTION
Even now it seems too early to assess, with any assurance, the
scope of the dangers posed by the Nixon administration. The flow of
memoirs of the period continues, ' and an almost imponderable store of
tape recordings and other "Presidential historical material" remains in-
accessible to researchers. 2 Yet whatever judgments may ultimately be
passed on the period as a whole, it is clear that the actions of the Nixon
administration revealed extraordinary attempts to concentrate power in
the executive branch at the expense of other organs of government.
After the Watergate episode and the resignation of the President,
the events of the Nixon period provoked a strong reaction against exec-
utive power. This reaction now seems, however, to be giving way to a
renewed tendency toward vigorous assertion of executive claims.3 In
this current period of apparent counter-reaction, it is important to re-
examine the assertions of executive power under President Nixon, both
to analyze the forms that those executive assertions assumed and to
inquire whether this analysis of recent history gives any further gui-
dance for the development of constitutional doctrine.4
Assertions of executive power under President Nixon did not rep-
resent a sharp break from the immediate past. Fueled by years of for-
eign emergencies and by the increasing centralization of the domestic
economy, presidential power and pretensions increased sharply during
the period following World War II. Under President Nixon this de-
velopment reached its apogee, both in the realities of presidential
power and also in the insouciance with which extensive claims of presi-
1. Memoirs already published include: J. DEAN, BLIND AMBITION: THE WHITE HOUSE
YEARS (1976); H. HALDEMAN, THE ENDS OF POWER (1978); H. KISSINGER, THE WHITE HOUSE
YEARS (1979); R. NIXON, THE MEMOIRS OF RICHARD NIXON (1978); J. SIRICA, To SET THE REc-
ORD STRAIGHT: THE BREAK-IN, THE TAPES, THE CONSPIRATORS, THE PARDON (1979).
2. See Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act of 1974, 44 U.S.C. § 2107
(1976); Note, Government Control of Richard Nixon's Presidential Material, 87 YALE L.J. 1601
(1978).
3. Although renewed executive claims have appeared in many areas, those relating to the
control of the Central Intelligence Agency have perhaps achieved the greatest prominence. See,
eg., Szulc, Putting Back the Bite in the C.I4., N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1980, § 6 (Magazine), at 28, 33
("Both Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, almost in identical phrases, have publicly demanded
that the agency be liberated from legislative constraints"); id at 62 (The Director of Central Intel-
ligence argues that covert operations are within the province of the executive branch and "it is not
proper to share that responsibility with the Congress").
4. Cf. Berger, The President andthe Constitution, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 97 (1975); Swindler, The
Constitution 4fter Watergate, 28 OKLA. L. REv. 467 (1975) (evaluating the effects of the legislative
and judicial events of 1973-1974 on the American constitutional system).
5. See Cox, Watergate and the Constitution of the United States, 26 U. TORONTO L.J. 125,
125-27 (1976).
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dential authority were asserted.6
To the extent that the shift in power to the President and his per-
sonal staff occurred at the expense of established cabinet offices, there
was little effective resistance.7 Furthermore, Congress was reluctant to
oppose many of the most important assertions of executive authority,
until the Watergate episode brought legislators face to face with the
problem of presidential power, framed not as an issue of political prin-
ciple but as a simple question of criminal right and wrong. During the
Watergate period, Congress enacted legislation to curb presidential
claims of war-making authority and to limit the President's power to
impound funds appropriated by Congress.8 Aside from such efforts,
however, Congress as a body remained relatively passive on the issue
of presidential power until the impeachment inquiry itself.9 But in po-
litical life, as elsewhere, when important interests are affected, there
6. See H. COMMAGER, THE DEFEAT OF AMERICA 137 (1974); A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPE-
RIAL PRESIDENCY 187 (1973).
7. P. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 198 (1978). For example, President
Nixon sought to reorganize the federal government by placing major executive departments (in-
cluding cabinet offices) under the control of presidential assistants. See J. SCHELL, THE TIME OF
ILLUSION 296-98 (1976). At the beginning of his second term Nixon attempted to accomplish a
fundamental reorganization of this type by executive order rather than by statute. See P. KUR-
LAND, supra, at 198.
A shift of power to presidential assistants at the expense of cabinet officers, though in form a
shift of power within the executive branch, may in fact significantly reduce the legislature's ability
to supervise executive action. See J. SCHELL, supra, at 107-08. Unlike cabinet officers, presiden-
tial assistants are not confirmed by the Senate-a process that can result in the rejection of a
nominated officer or, perhaps even more important, in the securing of concessions relating to an
official's conduct in office. The confirmation of Elliot Richardson as Attorney General, for exam-
ple, was expressly made contingent on his promise to appoint a special prosecutor to investigate
the Watergate affair. P. KURLAND, supra, at 76. Furthermore, in contrast to the practice of cabi-
net officers, presidential assistants have ordinarily refused to testify before congressional commit-
tees even when the assistants have functions as important makers of policy. See, e.g., War Powers
Legislation: Hearings on . 731, .J Res. 18, and S.J Res. 59 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 430-34 (1972) [hereinafter cited as War Powers Hearings] (noting
the refusal of National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger to testify before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee).
8. See, ag., War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50
U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1976)); Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1407 (1976)). See also note 19 infra.
9. Certain committees of Congress did seek to investigate issues raised by executive claims.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, for example, probed executive actions relating to the
Vietnam War. See, e.g., War Powers Hearings, supra note 7, at 483-538. Also notable were com-
mittee hearings concerning the doctrine of executive privilege, military surveillance of political
dissidents, and related separation-of-powers problems. See, e.g., Executive Privilege: The With-
holding of Information by the Executive: Hearings on S. 1125 Before the Subcomnm on Separation
ofPowers of the Senate Comm of the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Executive Privilege Hearings]; S. REP. No. 1227, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 21-25 (1974) (detailing 1973-
1974 investigations by the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights concerning military sur-
veillance of political dissidents).
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seems to be a law of conservation of conflict. When Congress failed to
take up the gauntlet, the focus of resistance moved to the federal courts
and occasionally to the Supreme Court. In such cases the Government
was not permitted to justify its acts simply by power alone; instead, it
was obliged to reconcile the extensive claims of executive authority
with constitutional principles.' 0
A principled constitutional argument for the exercise of presiden-
tial power claims that the Constitution authorizes the President to take
the action at issue. The constitutionality of presidential authority, how-
ever, was not the only argument available to the administration's law-
yers. They also asserted that whether or not the Constitution permits
the President to act in the manner asserted, the courts lack the power to
decide the question of presidential authority--either because the Con-
stitution itself explicitly withholds the question from the courts, or be-
cause the issue is too complex for judicial resolution." This argument
invokes the "political question" doctrine, which posits that some consti-
tutional issues are to be decided by the executive branch or Congress,
not by the courts.' 2 In addition the Government argued that certain
challenges to executive authority are nonjusticiable because no litigant
has standing to raise the issue in a judicial forum.' 3
It was by the use of these approaches--the arguments on the mer-
its and on the ground ofjusticiability-that lawyers for the government
10. Many of the Government's arguments required courts to write on a clean slate. See J.
CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 260 (1980) ("[R]elatively few
[separation of powers] questions have been presented for judicial resolution-particularly before
the 1970s-and even fewer have ever reached the docket of the Supreme Court").
11. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 25-28 infra.
12. The literature on the political question doctrine is extensive. See, e.g., Scharpf, Judicial
Review and the Political Question 4 Functional 4nalysir, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966). Some com-
mentators doubt that a coherent political question doctrine actually exists; they argue that most
political question decisions actually find that the political branches have acted within their consti-
tutional authority. See Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597
(1976); Tigar, Judicial Power, the "Political Question Doctrine, "and Foreign Relations, 17 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 1135 (1970). Others view the doctrine as a technique for disqualifying the judiciary from
deciding the constitutionality of a particular action without in any way endorsing the constitution-
ality of the action itself. See Casper, Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct of Foreign and
Defense Policy: 4 Non-Judicial Model, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 463, 469-73 & n.34 (1976); Sager, Fair
Measure" The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1224-
26 (1978).
The political question doctrine, as used by the President, asserts that the law, at least as
applied by the courts, does not restrict presidential action in the area at issue. Judicial acceptance
of such an argument thus constitutes acquiescence in the creation of an area of effectively un-
restricted executive power. Cf. Pollak, The Constitution as an Experiment, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1318, 1337-38 (1975) (If certain issues relating to allocation of war powers between President and
Congress cannot be judicially determined, "we would be perilously close to confessing institu-
tional bankruptcy as to... part of the Constitution...").
13. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 126-31 infra.
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sought to avoid judicial interference with presidential or other execu-
tive action. In these attempts they were in the main unsuccessful, at
least with respect to the principal domestic issues of the Nixon presi-
dency. 14 Even so, the courts made significant concessions to presiden-
tial power. An examination of some of the cases of the Nixon period
indicates the breadth of presidential claims and the caution with which
the courts rejected some of these positions.' 5 This examination also
suggests that the executive's claims and the related litigation of the pe-
riod presented two distinct separation-of-powers problems: In one set
of cases, strong claims of presidential power appeared to pose dangers
to the process by which the will of the majority is (or should be) trans-
lated into law.' 6 A second and more complex set of problems arose
from the relationship between the doctrine of separation of governmen-
tal powers and the protection of constitutional rights of individuals
against the will of the majority.' 7 This second set of issues especially
needs examination, and that examination reinforces the view that an
important function of the separation of powers between Congress and
the executive is the adequate protection of individual constitutional lib-
erties, and consequently that a requirement of explicit legislative au-
thorization should be a prerequisite to any executive action that may
threaten individual constitutional rights.
II. EXECUTIVE ACTION UNDER PRESIDENT NIXON
A. The War in Indochina.
One focus of political attention during the initial years of the
Nixon administration was the continuing war in Southeast Asia.
American involvement in this conflict was an executive enterprise, al-
though not, of course, President Nixon's enterprise alone. The war was
conducted from the start by presidential initiative, and the Tonkin Gulf
Resolution,' 8 procured by President Johnson under questionable cir-
14. See, e.g., United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972); New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). These cases are discussed respectively in the text
accompanying notes 76-101 and 33-59 infra.
15. See, eg., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). See text accompanying notes 144-
52 infra.
16. See text accompanying notes 163-78 infra.
17. See text accompanying notes 191-273 infra.
18. Joint Resolution of August 10, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384. For commentary
on the effect of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, compare Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The
War Powers Act, 50 Tax. L. REv. 833, 874-92 (1972) (indicating that the Tonkin Gulf Resolution
authorized the hostilities in Vietnam) with War Powers Hearings, supra note 7, at 563 (argument
of Alexander M. Bickel that if the Tonkin Gulf Resolution "authorized anything, beyond an im-
mediate reaction [to the Tonkin Gulf incident], .. . it was an unconstitutionally broad delega-
tion"). See also Note, Congress, The President, and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81
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cumstances, lent only ambiguous congressional authority. Yet Con-
gress followed each presidential step, almost to the very end, with funds
and other necessary support.' 9 Constitutional theories advanced by the
Nixon administration to support the war in Southeast Asia did not rely
solely on these elements of congressional participation, however: the
administration also invoked presidential powers said to derive from the
Commander-in-Chief clause of article II.20 Similar assertions of execu-
tive war-making authority had accompanied the earlier escalation of
the Vietnam War under President Johnson.2 1
Since "an indifferent Congress provided little or no restraint on
executive actions,"22 challenges to the conffict in Southeast Asia moved
to the courts. Efforts to stop a major war by judicial action seemed
doomed from the outset, however, and the lawsuits, which the Supreme
Court declined to hear on the merits,2 3 are perhaps best viewed as as-
pects of a wider political resistance to the war, employing a special
form of rhetoric.24
HARV. L. REV. 1771, 1803-05 (1968). The Tonkin Gulf Resolution was repealed on January 12,
1971. Act of January 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-672, § 12, 84 Stat. 2053.
19. Congress repeatedly passed appropriations for the war and extended the Selective Service
Act. See Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042 nn. 2-3 (2d Cir. 1971); Berk v. Laird, 317 F. Supp.
715, 723-28 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). In contrast the Mansfield Amendment, Pub. L. No. 92-156, § 601(a),
85 Stat. 423 (1971), a congressional statement urging the early termination of hostilities, appeared
to be hortatory only, DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1156-57 & n.15 (2d Cir. 1973), and was, in
any event, disregarded by the President. A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 6, at 194.
Congress did, of course, finally terminate American participation in the war. Act of July 1,
1973, Pub. L. No. 93-52, § 108, 87 Stat. 130, 134 (withdrawing all funds for bombing and other
combat activities in Cambodia after August 15, 1973). See generally Eagleton, The August 15
Compromise and the War Powers of Congress, 18 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1 (1973). Earlier, Congress
had also denied funds for ground troops in Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia. A. SCHLESINGER,
supra note 6, at 194.
20. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee, Secretary of State William P. Rogers justified continuation of the Vietnam War as an exercise
of presidential power under the Commander-in-Chief clause "to withdraw our forces in an or-
derly way from Vietnam, in a way that is consistent with the policy of our initial involvement";
incursions into Laos and Cambodia, and the bombing of North Vietnam, were justified under the
President's power as Commander-in-Chief to protect remaining American troops and prisoners of
war. War Powers Hearings, supra note 7, at 504-05, 507-09, 521, 535-36. See also Fulbright,
Congress, the President and the War Power, 25 ARK. L. REV. 71, 82-83 (1971); Wormuth, The
Nixon Theory ofthe War Power. A Critique, 60 CAL. L. REV. 623, 623-24 (1972).
21. See OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, DEP'T OF STATE, THE LEGALITY OF UNITED
STATES PARTICIPATION IN THE DEFENSE OF VIETNAM, reprintedin Legality of UnitedStates Panic-
ipation in the Vietnam Confict: A Symposium, 75 YALE L.J. 1085, 1100-01 (1966) (asserting in-
dependent article II powers in addition to authority said to be conferred by the SEATO Treaty
and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution).
22. Eagleton, Congress and the War Powers, 37 Mo. L. REv. 1, 27 (1972).
23. See, eg., Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970) (denying a motion by the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts for leave to file a bill of complaint); Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934
(1967) (denying certiorari). See also Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973) (affirming the deci-
sion below without opinion).
24. The only injunction issued against hostilities in Southeast Asia was a district court order
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Yet the arguments that the courts used in rejecting these chal-
lenges are instructive. Because Congress had never clearly declared
war, a number of courts declined to legitimize the presidential effort.
Rather than holding that the President's actions were constitutionally
valid, these courts found that the executive's use of military force in
Southeast Asia raised political questions, which the judiciary lacked the
power to resolve.25 In another important line of decisions the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that congressional measures to
finance the war and to enact selective service legislation sufficiently au-
thorized the President's actions. A judicial determination that the form
of congressional participation was incorrect-that, for example, an ex-
plicit declaration of war was necessary-"would constitute a deep inva-
sion of the political question domain. ' 26 Furthermore, even after the
repeal of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution,27 the court of appeals held that
strategic and factual problems involved in the American withdrawal
from Southeast Asia made the constitutional issues of that period too
complex for judicial cognizance. 28 Consequently, whether the mining
of Haiphong Harbor and the continued bombing of Cambodia were
part of the authorized withdrawal, or whether these actions were new
presidential initiatives requiring new congressional authority, raised
nonjusticiable issues.
This invocation of the political question doctrine suggests an un-
derlying ambivalence: on the one hand, the courts were unwilling to
confront executive power in its most massive and uncompromising
requiring the Secretary of Defense to suspend the bombing of Cambodia a few days before the
deadline established by Congress for the conclusion of the bombing. See note 19 supra. The
injunction was stayed and ultimately reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
after attempts to dissolve the stay in the Supreme Court proved unsuccessful. See Holtzman v.
Richardson, 361 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'dsub. nom, Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307
(2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974). See also Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304
(1973) (opinion of Marshall, J., denying the application to vacate the stay); Holtzman v. Schles-
inger, 414 U.S. 1316 (1973) (opinion of Douglas, J., vacating the stay); Schlesinger v. Holtzman,
414 U.S. 1321 (1973) (opinion of Marshall, J., staying the order of the district court).
25. See, ag., Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967);
Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972), a 'd without opinion, 411 U.S. 911 (1973). See
also Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Other challenges to executive action were
dismissed for lack of standing. See, e.g., Pietsch v. President of the United States, 434 F.2d 861
(2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 920 (1971); Velvel v. Nixon, 415 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970).
26. Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d Cir. 1971).
27. See note 18 supra.
28. See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973) (the bombing of Cambodia
after the withdrawal of United States troops from Vietnam), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974);
DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973) (the mining of Haiphong Harbor).
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form; on the other hand, they were reluctant to legitimate extremely
questionable assertions of executive authority. The result, however,
was that the exercise of the presidential war-making power remained
free from effective judicial limitation.
It was only with the passage of the War Powers Resolution29 in
1973 that a tentative step was taken toward imposing principled'restric-
tions on claims of broad presidential war-making authority. In the res-
olution, enacted over President Nixon's veto, Congress sought to limit
presidential war-making power by requiring termination of the use of
troops if Congress fails to approve a presidential initiative within sixty
days or if, before the end of that period, Congress orders the with-
drawal of forces by concurrent resolution20 Significantly, the final
form of the resolution omitted provisions, originally proposed in the
Senate, that would have limited the circumstances under which the
President might authorize hostilities even within the sixty-day period
and before Congress acts.31 Although the purpose of the resolution was
to prevent a repetition of the Vietnam experience, its actual effect was
unclear. By seeking to limit only the duration of presidential adven-
tures once undertaken, Congress may have conceded to the President a
broad power to initiate hostilities that had not previously been recog-
nized or conferred. 32
29. Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1976)).
30. See id The initial sixty-day period can be extended to ninety days if the President certi-
fies that the extension is required by "unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of
United States Armed Forces" in the course of withdrawal. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1976). Other
sections of the resolution impose consultation and reporting requirements on the President, see Id
§§ 1542, 1543, and declare that congressional approval of United States participation in hostilities
may not be inferred from treaties or statutes, including appropriations acts, without explicit con-
gressional authorization, see id § 1547(a). See generally Spong, The War Powers Resolution Revls.
ited" Historic Accomplishment or Surrender?, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 823 (1975).
31. See War Powers Hearings, supra note 7, at 2-6; Glennon, Strengthening the War Powers
Resolution: The Case/or Purse-String Restrictions, 60 MINN. L. REv. 1, 3 & n.13 (1975). Although
section 1541(c) states that the "constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to
introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities. . . are exercised only" in specified circum-
stances, this language appears to be hortatory only. See Spong, supra note 30, at 837-41.
32. See T. EAGLETON, WAR AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER 201-25 (1974). See also Black, The
Presidency and Congress, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 841, 850 (1975); Dorsen, Separation ofPowers
andFederalism, 41 ALB. L. REv. 53,57 (1977). One commentator has argued that the War Powers
Resolution is deficient because it lacks a method of enforcement other than impeachment. See
Pollak, supra note 12, at 1337-38.
Although not often litigated, other executive assertions of unilateral authority to make for-
eign policy were continued if not accelerated during the Nixon period. For example, President
Nixon followed his recent predecessors in making certain foreign policy commitments by "execu-
tive agreement," a practice that has increased substantially in importance since the 1930s. See,
e.g., War Powers Hearings, supra note 7, at 529-30 (describing an executive agreement on United
States military bases in Spain). See generally Berger, The Presidential Monopoly ofForeign Rela-
tions, 71 MIcH. L. REv. 1 (1972); Rovine, Separation oPowers and International ExecutiveAgree-
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B. The Pentagon Papers.
The executive origins of the Vietnam War led to the first great test
in the Supreme Court of presidential power under President Nixon. In
June 1971 the New York Times began publishing documents and com-
mentary drawn primarily from a defense department history of the Vi-
etnam War, commissioned by Robert McNamara late in his tenure as
Secretary of Defense. The Pentagon history and the accompanying
documents, classified as "top secret," disclosed the steps leading to the
initiation and escalation of the war with greater authority and in
greater detail than other material then available.3 3 The inevitable ef-
fect of the Times study was to discredit further the government's public
version of the war. As a sidelight, the study also showed the negligible
ments, 52 IND. L.J. 397 (1977). In August 1972, however, Congress took an initial step toward
monitoring executive agreements when it required the President to report international agree-
ments, other than treaties, to Congress or, in some instances, to committees of Congress. Act of
Aug. 22, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-403, 86 Stat. 619 (1972) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 112b (1976)).
Executive determinations of foreign policy in the last three decades were also reflected in
covert foreign activities undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), including, for ex-
ample, the financing of friendly political parties in foreign nations and an active involvement in
seeking to overthrow certain hostile regimes. See generally Walden, The CIA.: A Study in the
Arrogation of(Administrative Powers, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 66, 69 (1970); Wise, Covert Opera-
tions.Abroad, in THE CIA FILE 3-27 (R. Borosage and J. Marks eds. 1976). Although the CIA is
an executive agency created by statute, there was no clear statutory authority for covert operations
such as those described in P. WYDEN, BAY OF PIGS (1979), and W. COLBY & P. FORBATH, HON-
ORABLE MEN: My LIFE IN THE CIA 108-40 (1978).
In the Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1974, 22 U.S.C. § 2422 (1976), Congress prohibited the
CIA from spending money for covert operations and other foreign activities not "intended solely
for obtaining necessary intelligence," unless it received presidential approval and reported the
operations to specified congressional committees. Id. A year later Congress prohibited any fur-
ther expenditures by the CIA for covert aid to Angola, for fear that the undertaking would de-
velop into a full scale war as in Vietnam. T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, FOREIGN POLICY BY
CONGRESS 46-57 (1979).
Following the disclosures of the Nixon years, Presidents Ford and Carter each issued execu-
tive orders to regulate the CIA and other intelligence agencies. See Exec. Order No. 12,036, 3
C.F.R. 112 (1979), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 app. (Supp. 1978) (President Carter); Exec. Order
No. 11,905, 3 C.F.R. 90 (1977), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 app. (1976) (President Ford). More
recently, legislation was introduced in the Senate for a new statutory charter for the agency. Pro-
posed National Intelligence Act of 1980, S. 2284, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 126 CONG. REc. S1307
(daily ed. Feb. 8, 1980). This effort, however, failed in the 96th Congress. See Effort to Enact
Intelligence Charter IsAbandoned by SenateAdvocates, N.Y. Times, May 2, 1980, § A, at 1, col. 2.
Instead Congress has passed a more limited bill that alters the reporting requirements set forth in
the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, Pub. L. No. 96-450, tit. V, § 501 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C.
§ 413).
33. The strengths and weaknesses of the Pentagon study as a source of historical investiga-
tion are discussed in Kahin, The Pentagon Papers: A Critical Evaluation, 69 Am. POL. SCL REv.
675 (1975), and Westerfield, What Use Are Three Versions of the Pentagon Papers?, 69 Am. PoL.
ScL REv. 685 (1975). See also Roche, The Pentagon Papers-4 Discussion, 87 POL. SC. Q. 173,
184 (1972). The study may also be valuable as a case history of the process of executive policy-
making. N. CHOMSKY, FOR REASONS OF STATE xxvi, 66 (1973).
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role accorded to Congress in planning the Vietnam conffict.34 Al-
though the study did not cover the period after early 1968, and thus did
not discuss the actions of the Nixon administration, the Government
sought to enjoin the publication of the "Pentagon Papers. '35
The government faced several obstacles in attempting to enjoin
publication of the Times series. Most obvious was the first amendment,
which prevents the government from "abridging the freedom of speech
or of the press," and which places particularly strict limits on injunc-
tions employed as prior restraints.36 Perhaps even more fundamental,
however, was the absence of a statute authorizing the executive or the
federal courts to prohibit the publication of the type of national defense
information in question.37 The Times argued that the only manner in
which the federal government may regulate most matters within federal
control is by lawmaking, which ordinarily emanates from the legisla-
ture and not from a federal court upon the request of the executive. 38
Indeed, the newspaper argued not only that no statute empowered the
courts or the President to prohibit publication of the Papers, but also
that Congress had specifically rejected the proposition that the publica-
34. One of the most striking revelations to emerge from the Pentagon papers was the
extraordinary secrecy with which the inner circle of the Johnson administration made
[its] fateful decisions of 1964 and 1965 ...
I was struck by the almost total exclusion of Congress from the policy-making proc-
ess. Insofar as Congress is mentioned at all in the Pentagon papers as published in the
press--and that is not often-it is referred to as an appropriate object of manipulation,
or as a troublesome nuisance to be disposed of.
Executive Privilege Hearings, supra note 9, at 23 (statement of Sen. Fulbright). "Viewed broadly
in the context of determining foreign policy, the Pentagon papers portray an ever-broadening,
almost boundless unilateral decisionmaking role by the post-World War II executive branch. The
papers show decisions being made without the knowledge and consent either of the Congress or
the people." War Powers Hearings, supra note 7, at 599 (statement of Sen. Eagleton).
35. See United States v. New York Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324, 326-27 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd,
444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). A second action was filed in the District of
Columbia against the Washington Post after the Post printed excerpts from the Pentagon Papers.
United States v. Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d 1322, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (en banc). Later
actions were filed against the Boston Globe and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. The Government
commenced no further suits though other newspapers began printing excerpts from the documents
after the litigation was underway. See S. UNGAR, THE PAPERS AND THE PAPERS 190-92 (1975).
36. U.S. CONST. amend. I; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). Although the first
amendment refers specifically to Congress, the freedoms of speech and press are generally inter-
preted to apply to government action in any form. See Henkin, The Right to Know andthe Duty to
Withhold- The Case of the Pentagon Papers, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 271, 277 (1971); Oakes, The
Proper Role of the Federal Courts in Enforcing the Bill of Rights, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 934-35
(1979).
37. On suits by the United States without statutory authorization, see generally P. BATOR, P.
MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1301-09 (1973). See also In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
38. See e.g., THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY V. UNITED STATES-A DOCUMENTARY His-
TORY 781-87, 932, 941-42, 1004 (L Goodale ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as DOCUMENTARY HIS-
TORY].
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tion of national defense information should generally be subject to
criminal or other penalties.39
In the lower courts the United States attorney asserted that even
without a statute the administration possessed "executive power" to se-
cure an injunction against publication of material damaging to the na-
tional security.4° Therefore, he implied, even if Congress had not
determined that the type of material in question should be subject to
prior restraint, the President and the courts together had the power to
make such a determination in the individual instance.41 Moreover, be-
cause the Government further asserted that the court should defer to
the President's decision that the Papers were too dangerous to be pub-
lished, the Government in effect argued that the President possessed
the power to suppress the study without either legislative rule or signifi-
cant judicial review.42
Before the Supreme Court the Government similarly contended
that the power to secure an injunction arose from the President's au-
thority to conduct foreign affairs and from his position as Commander-
in-Chief of the Armed Forces. 43 Also invoking the political question
doctrine, though not by name, the Government asserted that the courts
should defer to the executive because an assessment of the relevant
dangers required "difficult and complex judgments which do not lend
themselves to judicial resolution." 44
The Supreme Court refused to allow the injunction.45 In nine sep-
arate opinions (six opposing the injunction and three in favor of it), the
39. See DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 38, at 368-81. The Times also argued that Con-
gress had prohibited the publication of defense information only in specific, narrowly-defined
circumstances, which were not present in that case. See, e.g., id 368-70. See also note 238 infra.
40. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 38, at 716-21; see 328 F. Supp. at 327. The Govern-
ment also argued that a congressionally-authorized injunctive remedy arises by implication from
the espionage provision of 18 U.S.C. § 793 (1976); see 328 F. Supp. at 328.
41. Cf DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 38, at 786 (brief of New York Times).
42. See id 735-36. Although it rejected the Government's statutory argument, see note 40
supra, the district court noted that "even in the absence of statute the Government's inherent right
to protect itself from breaches of security is clear." 328 F. Supp. at 328. The district court refused
to issue an injunction, however, on the ground that no serious breach of security had been shown.
Id at 330.
43. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cs. 1, 2; see Brief for the United States at 13-20, New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), reprinted in 71 LANDMARK BRIEFS & ARGU-
MENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 133-40 (P. Kur-
land & G. Casper eds. 1975) [hereinafter cited as LANDMARK BRIEFS]. Despite its position in the
lower courts, see note 40 supra, the Government did not argue in the Supreme Court that statutory
authority existed for the issuance of an injunction. See 403 U.S. at 713.
44. Brief for the United States, supra note 43, at 18, reprintedin 71 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra
note 43, at 138.
45. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). For comment on the
decision, see Henkin, supra note 36.
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scope of first amendment protection against prior restraints appeared to
be the dominant issue.46 Yet as a substantial undercurrent in four
opinions47 and the major theme of one,48 there ran the argument that
the President was impermissibly calling upon the courts to make a law
relating to speech, in the absence of congressional authority and, argua-
bly, in a manner contrary to the wishes of Congress. 49 Resistance to
assertions of executive lawmaking power thus was important to a ma-
jority of the Court.50 In an important opinion that blends the two con-
stitutional themes, Mr. Justice White asserted that when first
amendment rights are at issue, the Government's position is especially
weak if the President seeks an injunction solely on the authority of his
office, rather than in accordance with the guidelines of congressional
lawmaking. Justice White implied that certain government action pos-
sibly threatening first amendment rights may be constitutionally per-
missible if authorized by Congress but not if initiated by the President
alone.51 The three dissenters, however, accepted the Government's po-
sition that the executive should be allowed to determine when publica-
46. This was also the issue mentioned in the per curiam opinion. New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
47. Id. at 718-19 (Black, J., concurring); id at 720-22 (Douglas, J., concurring); id at 730
(Stewart, J., concurring); id at 731-40 (White, J., concurring).
48. Id at 740-48 (Marshall, J., concurring).
49. Thus Justice White undertook to demonstrate that no statute provided for a prior re-
straint of the publication of the Pentagon Papers, though a subsequent criminal prosecution might
be authorized. Id at 733-40 (White, J., concurring). Justice Douglas suggested the broader prop-
osition that no federal statute authorized even subsequent criminal punishment for most publica-
tions of secret information. Id at 720-22 (Douglas, J., concurring); cf. Edgar & Schmidt, The
Espionage Statutes and Publication of Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. Rav. 929, 937, 1060
(1973) (supporting this view). Focusing exclusively on the separation-of-powers question, Justice
Marshall declared, "The Constitution provides that Congress shall make laws, the President exe-
cute laws, and courts interpret laws .... It did not provide for government by injunction in
which the courts and the Executive Branch can 'make law' without regard to the action of Con-
gress." 403 U.S. at 742 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall also noted that Congress had
"specifically rejected" a proposed statute that would have empowered the President to proscribe
publications that he considered dangerous to national security. Id at 745-47.
The applicability of federal criminal statutes to the publication of the Pentagon Papers was
never tested: the newspapers were not prosecuted and charges against Daniel Ellsberg, who made
the papers available to the Times, were dismissed after it became known that agents of the admin-
istration had burglarized the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist and intercepted Ellsberg's conversa-
tions on an illegal wiretap. J. LUKAS, NIGHTMARE: THE UNDERSIDE OF THE NIXON YEARS 329-
32 (Viking ed. 1976). See text accompanying notes 93-96 infra. See generally Boudin, The Ells-
berg Case: Citizen Disclosure, in SECRECY AND FOREIGN POLICY 291-311 (T. Franck & E. Weis-
band eds. 1974); Nimmer, National Security Secrets v. Free Speech: The Issues Left Undecided in
the Ellsberg Case, 26 STAN. L. REv. 311 (1974).
50. See Junger, Down Memory Lane: The Case of the Pentagon Papers, 23 CASE W. REs. L.
REv. 3, 19 (1971). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 17-2, at 1140 (1978).
51. White remarked:
I... agree that the United States has not satisfied the very heavy burden that it must
meet to warrant an injunction against publication in these cases, at least in the absence of
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tions thought to endanger national security should be restrained and to
enforce such determinations against individuals in the federal courts.
52
The question of the allocation of policy-making authority, raised
in the Pentagon Papers case, recalls problems that had been considered
in a major case of the Truman era, the famous Steel Seizure decision of
1952.53 At the height of the Korean War, President Truman ordered
the seizure of most of the nation's steel mills to avoid a strike that
threatened to interrupt the manufacture of necessary war materials. In
a suit by the steel companies, the Supreme Court required the Govern-
ment to relinquish possession of the mills on the ground that the presi-
dential order constituted impermissible executive lawmaking. The
Court found that no statute authorized the seizure and, moreover, that
Congress had manifested its intention that seizure not be available as a
remedy for this type of labor dispute. The opinion of the Court empha-
sized that the Constitution vests "All legislative Powers herein granted"
in the Congress. 54 Correlatively, the President's role is to "take Care
that the Laws"-that is, the laws as made by Congress--"be faithfully
executed. ' '55 Although the concurring opinions may qualify this posi-
tion,5 6 the outcome of the Steel Seizure case supports the view that
within the federal government it is the function of Congress to make
express and appropriately limited congressional authorizationfor prior restraints in circum-
stances such as these.
At least in the absence of legislation by Congress, based on its own investigations and
findings, I am quite unable to agree that the inherent powers of the Executive and the
courts reach so far as to authorize remedies having such sweeping potential for inhibiting
publications by the press .... To sustain the Government in these cases would start the
courts down a long and hazardous road that I am not willing to travel, at least without
congressional guidance and direction.
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 731-33 (1971) (White, J., concurring) (em-
phasis added). For interpretations of Justice White's opinion similar to that in the text, see J.
CHOPER, supra note 10, at 329; and Junger, supra note 50.
52. 403 U.S. at 756-59 (Harlan, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J.).
Justice Harlan argued that "the scope of the judicial function in passing upon the activities of the
Executive Branch of the Government in the field of foreign affairs is very narrowly restricted."-
Id at 756. According to Justice Harlan, judicial review of executive-branch acts should cease
upon a finding that "the subject matter of the dispute does lie within the proper compass of the
President's foreign relations power," and that the head of the appropriate executive department
has determined "that disclosure of the subject matter would irreparably impair the national secur-
ity. .. ." Id at 757. In such a case, an injunction against publication of the material could issue.
53. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.'579 (1952). The numerous similari-
ties between the problems of the Pentagon Papers and Steel Seizure cases are examined in Junger,
supra note 50.
54. U.S. COtsT. art. I, § 1, quoted in 343 U.S. at 588.
55. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 3, quoted in 343 U.S. at 587; id at 632-33 (Douglas, J., concurring).
56. 343 U.S. at 593-628 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id at 629-34 (Douglas, J., concurring);
id at 634-55 (Jackson, J., concurring in judgment and opinion); id at 655-60 (Burton, J., concur-
ring injudgment and opinion); id at 660-67 (Clark, J., concurring in judgment). See note 58 infra.
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policy, and that presidential lawmaking without congressional author-
ity is narrowly circumscribed.5 7 As the concurring opinions empha-
sized, presidential authority is particularly limited where congressional
action manifests an intent that the President not be authorized to act.5 8
The prevailing opinions in the Pentagon Papers case largely reaffirm
this position.5 9
C. Presidential Impoundment.
Assertions of presidential lawmaking authority similar to those ad-
vanced by the Government in the Steel Seizure case were also raised in
the impoundment controversy of the Nixon period. Although a
number of presidents since Jefferson had refused to spend certain funds
appropriated by Congress, President Nixon withheld substantially
larger amounts than any other.60 The large amount of withholding,
however, was not the only critical issue. Although the administration
ordinarily justified these refusals to spend as a means of general fiscal
restraint, the cuts were effected in a manner that weakened or de-
stroyed legislative programs to which President Nixon objected as a
57. "Beyond any nose count or reinterpretation of opinions, the Steel Seizure case has
achieved a life of its own as a great constitutional decision imposing limits on the executive pre-
rogative beyond any lawyer's narrowing." Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82
YALE L.J. 227, 243 (1972). But see Black, The Presidency and Congress, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
841, 851-52 (1975) (supporting "a general 'executive power'" in the "absence of a Congressional
determination covering the same policy ground"); Monaghan, Presidential War-Making, 50 B.U.
L. REv. (Special Issue) 19, 22-23 (1970) (arguing that the Court in the Steel Seizure case acknowl-
edged certain presidential emergency powers in the absence of statute).
58. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 637-38 (Jackson, J.,
concurring):
When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority,
... there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority
When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will
of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb. . . . Courts can sustain exclusive presiden-
tial control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.
59. See notes 45-52 supra and accompanying text. The result in the Pentagon Papers case,
prohibiting a prior restraint, must be contrasted with subsequent cases in which courts have issued
prior restraints against publications by former CIA employees in violation of Agency secrecy
agreements. See, e.g., United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1063 (1972). See also Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam) (discussed in detail
in text accompanying notes 287-302 infra); United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990
(W.D. Wis.) (preliminary injunction against the publication of an article describing the structure
of the hydrogen bomb, pursuant to a statute explicitly authorizing the injunctive remedy), appeal
dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979).
60. Mikva & Hertz, Impoundment of Funds-Yhe Courts, The Congress and The President: A
Constitutional Triangle, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 335, 336 (1974). In 1973 it was estimated that the "total
amount withheld over the last two years may be as high as $25 billion." Comment, Presidential
Impounding of Funds: The Judicial Response, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 328 (1973).
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matter of policy. 6 t The president thus asserted the authority to deter-
mine, as a matter of policy, which congressional spending programs
should be implemented and which should be abolished or curtailed.
Similarly, Nixon refused to administer certain programs in accordance
with their statutory terms, on the ground that he did not intend to re-
quest funds for the programs in subsequent budget messages. Because
no funds were to be requested for the future, the administration argued,
orderly procedure required that the funds on hand be used to terminate
the programs before the end of the current fiscal year.62
To the extent that Congress did not authorize the President to
withhold funds or terminate programs, taking such action constituted
executive lawmaking. A congressional decision to create a program
and to budget a certain amount for that program reflects a determina-
tion to handle a social or economic problem in a particular manner.
An executive decision not to put the statute into effect, or to spend an
amount smaller than that required by statute, is equally an exercise of
lawmaking power: it is a determination by the executive that the prob-
lem should not be handled in the way that Congress has specified.63
Opponents of executive impoundment argued that the Constitution
grants lawmaking power exclusively to Congress; the exercise of that
power by the President therefore usurps congressional authority and
61. See, e.g., L. FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 169 (1975).
62. See id For example, the administration sought to abolish the Office of Economic Oppor-
tunity, a principal agency of the "War on Poverty," created by a Democratic Congress in the
1960s. In resulting litigation the administration was prevented from doing so. Local 2677, Am.
Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1973). The court in Phillps
pointed out that the President's budget message was precatory only, and that Congress remained
at liberty to appropriate funds for Office of Economic Opportunity programs even if the President
failed to request the appropriation. Id at 73, 75. The court concluded that the administration's
action in curtailing the programs was an impermissible attempt to usurp the lawmaking function
of Congress. Id at 76-79.
For a description of the attempted termination of the Regional Medical Programs, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 299a-e (1976), see Impoundment of Appropriated Funds by the President: Joint Hearings Before
the Ad Hoc Subcomm on Impoundment of Funds ofthe Comm. on Gov't Operations and the Sub-
comm, on Separation ofPowers ofthe Senate Comm; on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 482-85
(1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Impoundment Hearings].
63. Indeed, one administration official seemed to acknowledge this lawmaking: "I think the
considerations [in the President's elimination of congressional programs] might be likened to those
that the Congress gives to many matters before it. At some point it comes down to judgment."
1973 Impoundment Hearings, supra note 62, at 524 (statement of Roy L. Ash, Director of the
Office of Management and Budget). The same official also remarked that in order to remain
within the debt ceiling imposed by Congress, the President
was forced to go through item by item, all of the programs [for fiscal year 1973], and
determine to the best of his judgment those that we could best spend the moneys on,
those that would have less merit. . . . Certainly we are not drawing the line between
good programs and bad programs .... What we are doing is to draw the line between
good programs and sometimes better programs ....
Id 285, 287.
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violates the President's duty to "take Care that the laws be faithfully
executed."64
Arguments to the contrary by administration officials relied on an
inherent presidential lawmaking power of the type rejected in the Steel
Seizure case.65 In a statement before a Senate Committee, for example,
the Deputy Attorney General contended that the authority to impound
funds for the purpose of decreasing inflation constitutes a substantial
portion of the executive power vested in the President, and that to de-
prive him of this power would "convert the Chief Executive into 'Chief
Clerk.' "66 Government spokesmen also argued that the issues of pol-
icy involved in fiscal management were extremely complex and conse-
quently the matter of the President's authority to impound was a
nonjusticiable political question.67
Although no case testing the permissibility of executive impound-
ment reached the Supreme Court during the Nixon period, assertions
of power to withhold funds were generally rejected in the lower federal
courts.68 And in the waning months of the Nixon administration, Con-
64. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see Mikva & Hertz, supra note 60, at 378-79; 1973 Impoundment
Hearings, supra note 62, at 17, 33, 73, 80, 144-45, 244-46, 802.
65. See notes 53-58 supra and accompanying text. Assertions of an executive power to inter-
fere with congressional programs, either by impounding funds or refusing to implement certain
programs, appear to run afoul of even the narrowest reading of the Steel Seizure case, because in
exercising such a power the President acts in a manner "incompatible with the expressed or im-
plied will of Congress." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring); see note 58 supra. Indeed, a claim of an impoundment power goes
beyond the presidential claims rejected in the Steel Seizure case itself, in which any congressional
prohibition of presidential action was inferred from Congress's failure to act. Assertion of a con-
stitutional power to impound, in contrast, disregards even explicit requirements set forth by Con-
gress. See 1973 Impoundment Hearings, supra note 62, at 369 (statement of Joseph T. Sneed,
Deputy Attorney General).
66. 1973lImpoundment Hearings, supra note 62, at 369 (statement of Joseph T. Sneed, Deputy
Attorney General); see id 838. See also id 272, 299 (statement of Roy L. Ash, Director Designate,
Office of Management and Budget).
67. See id 365, 379, 383, 386 (statement of Joseph T. Sneed, Deputy Attorney General). See
also Mikva & Hertz, supra note 60, at 352-55.
In addition, government lawyers argued that the congressional spending legislation itself
granted discretion to the President to withhold appropriated funds, and that other congressional
statutes, particularly those limiting the national debt and requiring certain allocations to avoid
deficiencies, conferred the impoundment power claimed by the administration. See Note, Protect-
ing the Fisc: Executive Impoundent and Congressional Power, 82 YALE L.J. 1636, 1645-57 (1973).
68. See, e.g., People ex rel Bakalis v. Weinberger, 368 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. I11. 1973); Na-
tional Council of Community Mental Health Centers, Inc. v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 897
(D.D.C. 1973); Local 2677, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C.
1973).
In a case decided after President Nixon left office, the Supreme Court held that he could not
lawfully refuse to allot $6 billion in sewage treatment funds authorized for 1973 and 1974, because
the applicable statute did not permit such discretion. Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35
(1975). The Government did not assert an independent constitutional power to disregard a spe-
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gress passed a statute imposing specific restrictions upon any asserted
presidential power to impound. 69
The issues raised by presidential impoundment bear similarities to
the problems of the Pentagon Papers litigation, in that both matters
involved broad claims of executive power. Yet there is also a signifi-
cant distinction, relevant to other cases of the period as well, that ex-
poses two quite different separation-of-powers problems. In the
impoundment cases the President set his own general policies or rules
of law on social or economic matters, which executive departments
would subsequently enforce in specific instances in the same general
manner that the executive branch enforces congressional lawmaking by
statute.70 In the Pentagon Papers case, in contrast, the President was
attempting not only to formulate legislative policy--that publication of
certain forms of national defense information should be restrained-
but also to apply that newly-made policy to named entities in a specific
instance. Both the making of the policy and its application were under-
taken simultaneously; the application of the policy in the individual
case was not made pursuant to any general rule set forth in advance.
Most important, this application of newly-made policy threatened to
infringe a constitutional right, the freedom of the press.
This distinction illuminates the nature of the underlying dispute in
each set of cases. In the impoundment cases the issue was basically a
struggle over institutional competence-that is, over whether the legis-
lative branch or the executive branch should be allowed to prescribe
certain types of general rules on general economic and social matters. 71
In the Pentagon Papers case, however, the issue was not only which
branch should make general rules of policy, but also whether the liber-
ties of individuals are unduly threatened if the executive is permitted to
act in a manner that affects the specific constitutional rights of individ-
uals in the absence of legislative rules set down in advance. As this
article shows, issues of greater gravity and complexity are posed in the
second class of cases than in the first.72
cific congressional requirement. For a discussion of the decision's limited scope, see Note, Presi-
dentialImpoundment of ppropriatedFunds: The Supreme Court's First Pronouncement, 5 CAP. U.
L. REv. 81 (1976).
69. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1407
(1976). See generally L. Fisher, Congressional Budget Reform The First Two Years, 14 HARV. J.
LEGIs. 413 (1977).
70. Thus instead of the $11 billion in sewage treatment funds Congress authorized for 1973-
1974, there would henceforth be only $5 billion; instead of the Office of Economic Opportunity
program authorized by Congress, there would be no such program.
71. For discussion of this point, see notes 163-78 infra and accompanying text.
72. See notes 191-249 infra and accompanying text. It is useful for understanding the separa-
tion-of-powers problems of the Nixon period to focus on the distinction between two kinds of
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D. Warrantless Executive Surveillance.
1. "National Security" Wiretapping: The Keith Case. The Penta-
gon Papers case does not represent the only instance in which the
Nixon administration asserted power to act against individuals without
a general rule, in a way that threatened to violate specific constitutional
rights. None of these other assertions of executive power was more
important than the claim that the President possesses the constitutional
power to undertake electronic surveillance of individuals, without con-
gressional authorization or judicial warrant, in order to defend against
perceived dangers to "national security." Because wiretapping and
electronic eavesdropping are forms of search and seizure, 73 the fourth
amendment ordinarily prohibits the government from undertaking
such surveillance without obtaining a warrant from a neutral magis-
trate on a showing of probable cause to believe that a crime has been
commited and that information about the crime will be obtained by the
surveillance in question.74 The Administration contended, however,
that the governmental interest in preserving national security against
domestic dangers justified an exception to the warrant requirement.75
The Supreme Court considered the scope of this important safe-
guard in United States v. United States District Court,76 the so-called
executive action: (1) the formulation of a general rule that does not threaten individual constitu-
tional liberties and (2) action threatening the constitutional liberties of individuals in the absence
of any prior general rule. An intermediate category of executive action--executive promulgation
of a general rule threatening constitutional liberties-is also of practical importance and is treated
below. See notes 211, 287-301 infra and accompanying text.
73. Although the fourth amendment was originally held to restrict trespassory intrusions
only, see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), it was extended to nontrespassory elec-
tronic surveillance in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (overruling 0/instead).
74. See, eg., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55-56 (1967). Statutory provisions regulating
the procedure for initiating and maintaining electronic surveillance in other than national-security
cases are set forth in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976).
75. Beginning with President Roosevelt in 1940, prior administrations had engaged in war-
rantless wiretapping in national-security cases. For a history of warrantless wiretapping in the
United States, see Theoharis & Meyer, The "National Security" Justification for Electronic Eaves-
dropping. An Elusive Exception, 14 WAYNE L. Rv. 749 (1968).
76. 407 U.S. 297 (1972). The issue arose in the prosecution of three persons on charges aris-
ing from an alleged conspiracy to destroy government property. In response to a pretrial motion,
the Government conceded that federal agents had overheard conversations of one of the accused
on a telephone that had been subject to a warrantless wiretap. Judge Keith of the District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan held that the wiretap was illegal and ordered the Government
to deliver the records of the conversations to the accused. United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp.
1074 (E.D. Mich. 1971). The Government sought review of the order by a writ of mandamus in
the court of appeals, arguing that the warrantless wiretaps were lawful under the President's "na-
tional security" power. The court of appeals denied the writ, United States v. United States Dist.
Court, 444 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1971), a~fd, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari, 403 U.S. 930 (1971). See generaly Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
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Keith case. As frequently happens when broad executive power is as-
serted, the Government invoked threats of severe peril. Because of al-
leged national-security considerations, the Government argued that its
interest in warrantless wiretapping was "not merely law enforcement
... but protection of the fabric of society itself."' 77 The Government
found grave danger in politically-inspired bombings that occurred in
the United States between 1969 and 1971.78 Because "[a] fundamental
right of any society is to preserve itself,"79 the Government argued, the
vesting of executive power in the President in Article II of the Constitu-
tion implies presidential authority to use electronic surveillance to se-
cure information necessary "to protect the government against
destruction or such weakening as renders it impotent to function."80 A
judicial warrant requirement would interfere with the executive's re-
sponsibility by increasing the risk that sensitive information would be
disclosed.8 ' Moreover, judges would not be able to evaluate domestic
security intelligence adequately, for it "involve[s] matters outside the
'experience or facilities' of the judiciary. ' 82 Thus the political question
doctrine's questioning of judicial competence emerges here also, in a
somewhat different form.83
A review of the Government's argument in Keith suggests some of
the risks to individual rights implicit in this claim of executive author-
ity. In its brief the Government implied, for example, that any possible
abuse of power in warrantless executive wiretapping would be limited
because the Attorney General was personally required to approve the
77. Brief for the United States at 14, United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297
(1972), reprinted in 72 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 43, at 591.
78. Id 18, reprinted in 72 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 43, at 595.
79. Id 15, reprinted in 72 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 43, at 592.
80. Id 16, reprinted in 72 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 43, at 592-93.
81. Id 24-25, reprinted in 72 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 43, at 601-02.
82. Id 25-26, reprinted in 72 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 43, at 602-03 (citing T. TAYLOR,
Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 89 (1969)). The Government conceded that
even without a warrant requirement there might be subsequent judicial review of the executive's
decision, but made clear that any judicial inquiry should be "extremely limited." Brief for the
United States, supra note 77, at 22, reprinted in 72 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 43, at 599.
83. See Brief for the United States, supra note 77, at 21-23, reprinted in 72 LANDMARK
BRIEFS, supra note 43, at 598-600. In a further variation on the political question argument, the
Government asserted that any appropriate standard would not in any event be judicially manage-
able, because "national security" surveillance is primarily undertaken for "inteligence-gathering"
rather than for providing evidence for use in a criminal trial. The Government asked rhetorically,
"But what standard could a magistrate apply in determining whether to authorize surveillance for
intelligence gathering purposes in national security situations?" Reply Brief for the United States
at 4, United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), reprinted in 72 LANDMARK
BRIEFS, supra note 43, at 897.
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imposition of each national-security wiretap.84 An opposing brief char-
acterized this aspect of the Government's position in the following dra-
matic but basically accurate terms:
[T]he claim of executive power is a claim of arbitrary power uncon-
trolled by any meaningful judicial review. Only the word of the At-
torney General stands between the citizen and his or her liberties.
And this word we are asked to accept as unreviewable, as above the
law, as long as it is his word.85
This statement emphasized the danger of entrusting to any single indi-
vidual, no matter how conscientious, unrestrained power to act in a
manner that might threaten the constitutional rights of others. The At-
torney General who authorized the wiretaps at issue in Keith, and
whose determination the Government argued should be accepted with-
out effective review, was John Mitchell, who was later convicted of con-
cealing the involvement of government officials in another unlawful
search and seizure.86 This fact adds special poignancy to the fears of
abuse of power that normally arise when the executive asserts power to
act against individuals without legislative rule or effective judicial re-
view.
Assistant Attorney General Robert C. Mardian took a similar po-
sition in oral argument in Keith, contending that with respect to na-
tional-security wiretapping, the Court must rely on the integrity of the
executive branch. In making this argument Mardian remarked: "Now,
certainly neither this President nor any prior President has authorized
electronic surveillance to monitor the activities of an opposite political
group."' 87 Here also, reliance on the executive would prove a fragile
safeguard. At the time of this argument, it was not generally known
that Attorney General Mitchell and White House Chief of Staff H.R.
Haldeman had, under President Nixon's direction, ordered warrantless
84. See Brief for the United States, supra note 77, at 27 n.10, reprinted in 72 LANDMARK
BiUFFs, supra note 43, at 604. This position echoed the remark of William Rehnquist, then Assis-
tant Attorney General, testifying before a Senate Committee on a related problem: "I think it
quite likely that self-discipline on the part of the executive branch will provide an answer to
virtually all of the legitimate complaints against excesses of information-gathering." Federal Data
Banks, Computers and the Bill of J?'ghts: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of
the Senate Cora on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 603 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Data
Bank Hearings].
85. Brief for Defendant-Respondents at 44-45, United States v. United States Dist. Court,
407 U.S. 297 (1972), reprinted in 72 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 43, at 777-78.
86. Mitchell was convicted of conspiracy to obstruct justice and related offenses, in connec-
tion with his attempt to conceal the participation of White House officials in the Watergate bur-
glary. See United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 51 nn. 3 & 5 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977).
87. Oral Argument, United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), reprinted
in 72 LANDMARK BRmFs, supra note 43, at 1074.
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wiretaps to be placed on the telephones of newsmen and certain em-
ployees of the executive branch, including Morton Halperin, a staff
member of the National Security Council. Although this surveillance
was apparently undertaken to trace the source of information "leaks,"
the tap remained on Halperin's telephone after he left the government,
monitoring his subsequent antiwar activities and his work on Senator
Muskie's 1972 presidential campaign. Haldeman received periodic re-
ports of the information derived from the tap, some of which "was ap-
parently used for partisan political purposes."88
The danger that supposed national-security wiretapping might be
used for domestic political ends was not limited to the unusual circum-
stances of the Halperin case. At oral argument in Keith, for example,
the subjects of the wiretap contended that "secret surveillance" had al-
ready fallen "on leaders of the anti-war movement, black movements,
Catholic activist pacifists, [and] advocates of youth culture," 89 and that
President Nixon's Chief of Staff, H.R. Haldeman, had stated that critics
of Nixon's proposals on the Vietnam War were consciously "aiding
and abetting the enemy of the United States." 90 If the Attorney Gen-
eral were to agree that these critics threatened the national security,
then under the Government's doctrine the warrantless wiretapping of
many domestic dissident groups could have been justified.91
Events unrevealed at the time of the argument in Keith suggested
other implications of the Government's position. In an amicus brief
the American Civil Liberties Union asked whether the Government's
argument for warrantless wiretapping would not logically "extend to
other forms of obtaining intelligence such as entering and searching a
person's or a group's home, office, or desk without a judicial war-
88. Halperin v. Kissinger, 424 F. Supp. 838, 844-45 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd in part and rev'd and
remanded in part, 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 445 U.S. 924 (1980) (No. 79-880).
For examples of political intelligence gathered by this and related wiretaps, see SENATE SELECT
COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES,
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess., bk. II, at 235-37 (1976) [hereinafter cited as CHURCH REPORT]. See generally Shapiro, The
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Legislative Balancing of National Security and the Fourth
Amendment, 15 HARV. J. LEGIs. 119, 132-33 (1977) (other instances of supposed "national secur-
ity" surveillance used for political purposes).
89. See 72 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 43, at 1063 (argument of Arthur Kinoy on behalf
of wiretap subjects Sinclair et al.).
90. Id 1064. For Haldeman's comments on this remark, see H. HALDEMAN, supra note 1, at
251-52 (1978).
91. For an example of widespread intrusive activity based on a similar sort of executive deci-
sion, see the discussion of the Army's surveillance of public political activities, notes 109-34 infra
and accompanying text.
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rant."'92 If the Government possessed an unreviewable power to wire-
tap in national-security cases, the amicus suggested, the Government
might also possess an analogous constitutional power to break into a
house or office without a warrant to search for information bearing on
national security.
The author of this hypothetical argument could not have known
that some months earlier three agents of the White House, under the
direction of John Ehrlichman and G. Gordon Liddy, had broken into
the office of California psychiatrist Louis Fielding in search of medical
records relating to one of Dr. Fielding's patients-Daniel Ellsberg, the
distributor of the Pentagon Papers. 93 Yet in precisely the extension of
the argument in Keith foreseen by the American Civil Liberties Union,
John Ehrlichman later claimed that the breaking and entering of Field-
ing's office was "well within the President's inherent constitutional
powers." 94 At his trial for conspiring to deprive Dr. Fielding of his
fourth amendment rights, Ehrlichman argued, unsuccessfully, that the
national-security exception to the guarantees of the fourth amendment
permitted him, as a presidential agent, to authorize such a warrantless
intrusion.95 Although the extent of such intrusive activity was not
known when Keith was argued, subsequent disclosures have made clear
that the burglary of Dr. Fielding's office and the Watergate burglary
itself were only a few of many warrantless physical intrusions under-
taken by executive agencies during both the Nixon period and earlier
administrations. 96 The arguments in Keith, therefore, also possessed
significant implications for the future of this type of activity.
In Keith, one of the most important decisions of the Nixon period,
the Supreme Court rejected the administration's claim of constitutional
power to engage in warrantless wiretapping in domestic "national se-
92. Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Civil Liberties Union of
Michigan, Amid Curiae, at 21, United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972),
reprinted in 72 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 43, at 940. See also United States v. United States
Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 332 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
93. In the resulting criminal action Ehrichman denied that he authorized the burglary of Dr.
Fielding's office, but the jury decided the issue against him. United States v. Ehrlichman, 546
F.2d 910, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1120 (1977).
94. N.Y. Times, July 25, 1973, at 28, col. 7, quotedin A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 6, at 265.
95. See United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910, 924-25 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1120 (1977). See note 102 infra.
96. See generally CHURCH REPORT, supra note 88, bk. II, at 13. For references to alleged
burglaries committed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation from 1971 to 1973, see Aides to Bell
Call for Indictments of FB.L Offcials Oyer Break-ins, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
Recently, two former FBI officials were convicted for their role in approving warrantless break-ins
in 1972 and 1973 to gather information about the Weather Underground, a militant anti-war
group. 2 Ex-FB.L Officials Are Found Guilty in Break-ins Case, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1980, at Al,
col. I.
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curity" cases.97 The Court emphasized that the case involved first
amendment as well as fourth amendment values because political orga-
nizations antagonistic to prevailing policies are the organizations most
likely to be suspected by the government of raising domestic national-
security dangers. 98 In light of the special values of the first amendment
and the vagueness of the concept of national security, the Court con-
cluded that to permit official surveillance of domestic groups on the
basis of a decision made by the President without prior judical warrant
would create undue dangers of abuse.99
Although the Keith Court rejected the Government's position, a
significant measure of executive power to undertake warrantless sur-
veillance may nonetheless have survived. The Court's opinion did not
address the issue of presidential power to impose warrantless wiretaps
in foreign national-security cases, in which the activities of foreign
powers or foreign agents are thought to be involved. The Court care-
fully set such cases aside,l °° thereby leaving open the possibility that
the President may possess inherent power to wiretap without a warrant
in a foreign national-security case. 10 1
After Keith lower federal courts upheld warrantless electronic sur-
veilance in foreign national-security cases decided during the Nixon
97. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972). The Court also
rejected the Government's argument that Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1976), recognized the President's authority to conduct warrantless elec-
tronic surveillance in national-security matters. 407 U.S. at 303.
98. 407 U.S. at 313-14.
99. See id at 314. The Court noted that pressures on executive officers by virtue of their
prosecutorial duties may make them unreliable in determining when the governmental interest in
law enforcement should outweigh the constitutionally protected individual liberty interest. Id at
317.
100. Id at 321-22.
101. Because the line between foreign and domestic security surveillance is not always easy to
draw, such a distinction might raise serious problems of application. See id at 309 n.8. See also
Note, Foreign Security Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 87 HARV. L. Rav. 976, 987-88
(1974) (arguing that domestic political activity might consequently be subject to warrantless wire-
tapping under the guise of foreign intelligence surveillance).
In addition to reserving a possible foreign-security exception to the warrant requirement, the
Keith Court "recognize[d] ... the constitutional basis of the President's domestic security role,"
although it emphasized that that role must be performed consistently with the fourth amendment.
407 U.S. at 320. Because "domestic security surveillance may involve different policy and practi-
cal considerations from the surveillance of 'ordinary crime'," the Court noted, "the focus of do-
mestic surveillance may be less precise than that directed against more conventional types of
crime." Id at 322. Although this language is not entirely clear, it suggests that the issuance of a
domestic national-security warrant need not be constitutionally limited to instances in which the
Government can show probable cause to believe that a crime has occurred or is about to occur.
See Shapiro, supra note 88, at 146-47; Note, supra, at 995. The Court concluded that a warrant
may issue under "such reasonable standards as the Congress may prescribe." 407 U.S. at 324.
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period. 102 Moreover, subsequent administrations also claimed inherent
executive power to conduct such warrantless surveillance. The Justice
Department under President Ford, for example, not only asserted the
power to engage in warrantless wiretapping in foreign national-security
cases, but also claimed constitutional authority to undertake warrant-
less break-ins "into private premises" when "foreign espionage or intel-
ligence" was at issue. 03 Similarly, President Carter authorized
warrantless television surveillance of the office of a government em-
ployee suspected of engaging in espionage on behalf of the Vietnamese
Government. Defending the action, the Justice Department again in-
voked the inherent presidential power said to be implied by the general
language of article II of the Constitution.'1 4
102. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960
(1974); United States v. Butenko, 318 F. Supp. 66 (D.N.J. 1970), aff'd, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir.) (en
band), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974).
Other lower federal court decisions of the 1970s have imposed limits on the asserted foreign
national-security exception. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, for exam-
ple, has held that the exception must be limited to the electronic surveillance of individuals who
are agents of or collaborators with a foreign state. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (en bane), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); see 516 F.2d at 613-14 (plurality opinion); Id at
700 (Wilkey, J. concurring and dissenting); id at 706-07 (MacKinnon, J., concurring and dissent-
ing). The Zweibon court rejected the Government's argument that an exception should apply to
any group whose activities might affect foreign relations and, in consequence, held that the war-
rantless wiretapping of members of the Jewish Defense League was illegal. Even though the
League's activities may have affected relations between the United States and the Soviet Union,
the Government did not show that the members of the group were acting as agents of or in collab-
oration with a foreign power. In dictum a plurality of the court further suggested that all warrant-
less electronic surveillance-even "foreign security surveillance"-is unconstitutional in the
absence of "exigent circumstances." Id at 613-14 (plurality opinion); see Note, The Fourth
Amendment and Judicial Review of Freign Intelligence Wiretapping: Zweibon v. Mitchell, 45
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 55 (1976). For another decision limiting the asserted foreign national-secur-
ity exception, see United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910, 925-27 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1120 (1977) (holding that the foreign-security exception, if it exists, would apply only
when the President or the Attorney General specifically authorizes the proposed intrusion; author-
ization by a lower federal officer would not suffice).
103. United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal, J., concur-
ring), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1120 (1977); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 618 & n.66 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (en bane), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). See also United States v. AT & T Co., 551 F.2d
384 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Exec. Order No. 11,905, 3 C.F.R. 90 (1977), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 app.
(1976). However, the Ford administration endorsed a bill designed to provide a limited warrant
procedure for electronic surveillance in national-security matters. CHURCH REPORT, supra note
88, bk. II, at 135.
104. See United States v. Humphrey, 456 F. Supp. 51 (D. Va. 1978), af'd sub nom. United
States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980) (upholding warrantless electronic surveillance in
part, and warrantless opening of certain envelopes and packages, under the foreign national-secur-
ity exception). According to press reports, Carter and Attorney General Griffin Bell viewed the
cases as an excellent opportunity to reestablish executive power in this area. See Surveillance Order
by Carter Defended, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1978, at 2, col. 6.
Similarly, an executive order issued by President Carter asserted an executive power to un-
dertake warrantless electronic surveillance, television monitoring, and physical searches, in certain
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In 1978, however, Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act,105 which imposes limits on the power of the executive
branch to engage in electronic surveillance in foreign national-security
cases. The statute sets forth a warrant requirement for most forms of
foreign national-security surveillance and establishes special federal
courts to hear requests for warrants permitted by the Act. The scope of
the warrant requirement and the conditions for obtaining a warrant are
set out in a degree of detail that suggests an attempt to achieve a careful
balancing of governmental and individual interests.106 Along with the
War Powers Resolution'0 7 and the Congressional Budget and Im-
poundment Control Act,10 8 this statute is a significant step toward legis-
lative control of a broad range of unilateral powers asserted by
President Nixon and other administrations.
2. Political Surveillance by the Army. In Laird v. Tatum,10 9 de-
cided one week after the Keith case, the Supreme Court endorsed the
Government's view that the judiciary should not intervene to limit the
Army's collection and retention of information concerning the public
political activities of domestic individuals and groups. Specifically, the
Court held that the persons who had been subject to this form of sur-
veillance did not present a justiciable controversy when they sought
judicial review of the practice."10 Although the opinion in Laird deals
primarily with questions of standing and justiciability, the case illus-
trates the dangers of permitting executive action that affects individual
constitutional interests in the absence of a legislative rule.
Systematic Army surveillance of domestic political activity appar-
ently dated from President Johnson's decision to order the Army to
intervene in Detroit's 1967 racial disturbances."' The Army subse-
quently expanded an existing program of surveillance and infiltration
cases in which it appears that the party being searched may be "an agent of a foreign power."
Exec. Order No. 12,036, 3 C.F.R. § 2-201(b) (1979). For the position of the Carter Administration
on proposed legislation that ultimately developed into the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2518, 2519 (Supp. 1979), see text accompanying
notes 261-65 infra.
105. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2511, 2518, 2519 (Supp. 1979)). The legislative history of this statute is discussed in the text
accompanying notes 260-73 infra.
106. See note 272 infra and text accompanying notes 260-71 infra.
107. See notes 29-32 supra and accompanying text.
108. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
109. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
110. Id at 13-14.
111. CHURCH REPORT, supra note 88, bk. II, at 77; Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 5 (1972).
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of antiwar organizations." 2 Army intelligence agents photographed
speakers and crowds at antiwar rallies, maintained the information in
computer files, and distributed the information widely to state and fed-
eral government officials."13 The Army apparently also maintained
lists of individuals who were thought, because of their political views,
to be likely sources of trouble in the future. 1 4
The preamble to the Army's 1968 Intelligence Plan suggests the
general orientation of the surveillance program: "Although it cannot
be substantiated that the anti-war and the anti-draft movements are
acting in response to foreign direction, it must be pointed out that by
their activities they are supporting the stated objectives of foreign ele-
ments which are detrimental to the USA."1 15 Another Army docu-
ment, also written in the late Johnson years, stated: "The Army is well
aware that the overwhelming majority in both the anti-war and the ra-
cial movements are sincere Americans. It also realizes that in both
groups there is a small but virulent number who are out to tear
America apart."" 6 Notwithstanding the ostensible focus on that
"small but virulent number," the Defense Department later conceded
that the Army's surveillance program was "[s]o comprehensive ...
that. . . information related even remotely to people or organizations
active in a community in which the potential for a riot. . . was pres-
ent" might be collected. 117 The program was allegedly concealed for
some time from civilian defense-department officials, 18 and the mili-
112. It has been asserted that the "Army practices, while largely expanded in the 1967-70
period, began in 1917." Comment, Laird v. Tatum" The Supreme Court and a First Amendment
Challenge to Military Surveillance of Lawful Civilian PoliticalActivity, 1 HOFSTRA L. REv. 244, 266
(1973).
113. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. at 25 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Among the groups apparently
observed were the Women's Strike for Peace, the American Friends Service Committee, Ameri-
cans for Democratic Action, the Congress of Racial Equality, the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, and the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Brief for Respondents at 6-7, 18 n.27, Laird v.
Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972), reprinted in 73 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 43, at 123, 135 n.27.
114. Brief for Respondents, supra note 113, at 13-14, reprinted in 73 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra
note 43, at 130-31.
115. 1971 Data Bank Hearings, supra note 84, at 420.
116. Id 383.
117. Id 384. The Church Committee later estimated that the Army retained intelligence files
on 100,000 individuals. CHuRCH REPORT, supra note 88, bk. II, at 6. Senator Adlai Stevenson III,
the Reverend Ralph Abernathy, and Representative (now Judge) Abner Mikva were among those
subject to surveillance. Note, Judicial Review of Military Surveillance of Civilians: Big Brother
Wears Modern Army Green, 72 CoLUM. L. REV. 1009, 1011 (1972). See also Baskir, Reflections on
the Senate Investigation of Army Surveillance, 49 IND. L.J. 618, 623-27 (1974). For a description of
the apparently unchecked proliferation of this program, see Comment, supra note 112, at 255-59,
271-74 (1973).
118. Brief of a Group of Former Army Intelligence Agents, Amid Curiae, at 22-23, Laird v.
Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972), reprinted in 73 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 43, at 258.
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tary initially evaded subsequent orders by civilian officials that the pro-
gram be curtailed." 19
Although the Army was created by statute,120 and its activities are
regulated by statute,' 21 no statute specifically authorized the Army to
gather information secretly about the political activities of civilians and
to infiltrate their political groups, or to create and circulate political
blacklists.122 The Government maintained that the surveillance and in-
formation-gathering were necessary for the Army to perform ade-
quately if again called upon to engage in riot control, an activity that is
authorized by statute upon presidential order.123 It is extremely doubt-
ful, however, that Congress intended to approve this extraordinary
means of pursuing the authorized end.124
Consequently, the Army's surveillance program appears to have
been the result of an executive decision, unauthorized and unregulated
by Congress. Whether or not the surveillance violated first amendment
rights by chilling the exercise of political speech, as the plaintiffs in
Laird v. Tatum125 claimed, there were no clear legislative standards to
prevent the Army from deciding, as it apparently did, that the activities
of even the most innocuous political groups should be monitored.
When the Army program was challenged in the federal courts, the
Government's principal response was not that the program was consti-
tutionally valid (though it argued this position) 126 but rather that be-
cause the program caused no tangible injury to any specific individual,
the controversy was not justiciable and the plaintiffs lacked standing to
raise the issue in a judicial forum.127 Even if the plaintiffs feared that
119. Id 28-29, reprinted in 73 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 43, at 263-64.
120. See generally 10 U.S.C. (1976 & Supp. 111978) (scattered sections); see also U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cls. 12, 14-16; cf Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 644 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) ("While Congress cannot deprive the President of the command of the
army and navy, only Congress can provide him an army or navy to command.")
121. See generally 10 U.S.C. §§ 3001-4840 (1976), as amended.
122. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. at 16 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
123. Brief for, Petitioners at 31-33, Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972), reprinted in 73
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 43, at 91-93; see 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-333 (1976). See also 1971 Data
.Bank Hearings, supra note 84, at 598-99.
124. On the issue of statutory authorization, see Note, supra note 117, at 1043-46.
125. 408 U.S. 1, 3 (1972).
126. Oral Argument, Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972), reprinted in 73 LANDMARK BRIEFS,
supra note 43, at 337-38.
127. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 123, at 17-42, reprinted in 73 LANDMARK BRIEFS,
supra note 43, at 77-102. The plaintiffs, alleging that their political activities had been subject to
surveillance by the Army, brought a class action to enjoin the surveillance program. The district
court dismissed the complaint as not presenting a justiciable controversy, see 444 F.2d at 949, but
the court of appeals reversed, id at 959. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 404 U.S. 955
(1971), and reversed, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
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the Army might later misuse the information it collected (for example,
by denying government employment on the basis of political beliefs), a
claim based on that hypothetical possibility was not ripe for adjudica-
tion. 12 8
The Supreme Court agreed that the challenge presented no justici-
able claim.' 29 Any possible chilling effect imposed on the speech of
individuals by having their remarks recorded and kept in Army files
was found to be an insufficient predicate for judicial action. The result,
though cast in the language of justiciability, implied a determination
that the Army's surveillance did not violate the constitutional rights of
any individual. 130 The Army's program was thus insulated from judi-
cial review even though no statute authorized the Army to undertake
surveillance of private citizens and consequently no legislative guide-
lines or principles regulated that surveillance.' 31
The extent of the discretion exercised by the Army is suggested by
an exchange between Senator Edward Kennedy and Robert Froehlke,
an Assistant Secretary of Defense under President Nixon.' 32 At a Sen-
ate hearing, the two discussed the criteria that a civilian defense-de-
partment official might use in approving requests by the Army to
engage in political surveillance:
Senator Kennedy: And what criteria does he [the civilian official]
use?
Froehlke: Judgment, his judgment.
128. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 123, at 24 n.23, 40-42, reprinted in 73 LANDMARK BRIEFS,
supra note 43, at 84 n.23, 100-02. The Government further argued that if the Army had exceeded
its statutory authority in conducting the surveillance, Congress rather than the judiciary was "par-
ticularly well suited" to exercise supervisory authority over the program. Id 33-34, reprintedin 73
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 43, at 93-94.
129. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).
130. See, e.g., Bogen, Balancing Freedom of Speech, 38 MD. L. REv. 387, 468 n.348 (1979).
131. Although the Government asserted that the Army had substantially curtailed its surveil-
lance activities, Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 10-14, Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972), re-
printed in 73 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 43, at 223-27; Oral Argument, supra note 126,
reprinted in 73 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 43, at 338-39, the holding in Laird v. Tatum did not
rest on these assertions. See 408 U.S. at 10-15. Rather, political surveillance of the type described
in Laird v. Tatum remains insulated from constitutional attack, so long as no litigant can show
that the information collected has actually been used to his detriment. See, e.g., Berlin Demo-
cratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 149-51 (D.D.C. 1976).
The reasoning of the Court's opinion also appears to shield "political intelligence" investiga-
tions conducted by other federal agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation. See, e.g.,
Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 510 F.2d 253 (2d Cir.) (FBI's surveillance of a Young
Socialist Alliance convention), applicationfor stay denied, 419 U.S. 1314 (1974); Fifth Ave. Peace
Parade Comm. v. Gray, 480 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1973) (FBI's collection and dissemination of infor-
mation relating to participants in a 1969 anti-war demonstration). For political intelligence gath-
ering by the FBI, see generally CHURCH REPORT, supra note 88, bk. II, at 70-76.
132. Froehlke subsequently became Secretary of the Army. Comment, supra note 112, at 259
n.90.
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Senator Kennedy: Completely a subjective determination?
Froehlke: As of this moment, yes. .... 33
Although Froehlke agreed that criteria should be formulated, he
presented no clear idea of what criteria would suffice. Indeed, even if
civilian executive officials laid down guidelines, such rules would be
subject to change by the executive branch itself.
In sum, the Army's surveillance program exemplified executive ac-
tion undertaken without legislative standards in an area in which the
constitutional interests of individuals were potentially threatened. The
result, as long as the program remained secret, was an unrestrained
invasion of interests related to first amendment rights, even though
those interests were not held to present a judicially cognizable first
amendment claim.
134
E. Executive Privilege.
Perhaps the most emblematic of the Nixon administration's execu-
tive assertions-and the legal claim most clearly associated with the
events surrounding that administration's premature conclusion-was
that of executive privilege, the doctrine that the executive is empowered
to withhold certain information from the courts and Congress and, con-
sequently, from the public. Although earlier presidents had sometimes
relied on such a doctrine, 35 by 1973 the Nixon administration had in-
yoked the privilege in response to congressional requests for informa-
133. 1971 Data Bank Hearings, supra note 84, at 435.
134. In addition to information-gathering by the Army and the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, see note 131 supra, other executive agencies, such as the Internal Revenue Service, collected
political intelligence without authorization and put some of the information to improper use.
CHURCH REPORT, supra note 88, bk. II, at 6-7, 174. See Zwerling, Federal Grand Juries v. Attorney
Independence and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1263, 1277 & n.71 (1976). Fur-
thermore, the Central Intelligence Agency investigated some domestic political groups, in appar-
ent violation of its statutory charter. CHURCH REPORT, supra note 88, bk. II, at 174-75, 703-04,
712-15 (project CHAOS); id. 721-26, 727-29 (projects RESISTANCE and MERRIMAC).
The Justice Department also collected political data. See 1971 Data Bank Hearings, supra
note 84, at 894-914; CHURCH REPORT, supra note 88, bk. II, at 78-81. Indeed it appears that
during the Nixon period the Justice Department sometimes used grand juries to gather informa-
tion not only for use in contemplated prosecutions, but also to supplement the government's files
on suspect individuals and political groups. See generally Donner & Cerruti, The Grand Jury
Network, 1972 NATION 5; Zwerling, supra, at 1265-75; Comment, Federal Grand JuryInvestigation
of Poltical Dissidents, 7 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 432 (1972). In subsequent legislative action,
Congress has imposed limits on the maintenance of certain political intelligence files. Privacy Act
of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976). Furthermore, the Justice Department has sought to restrict intel-
ligence activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation by internal regulation. See generally J.
ELLIFF, THE REFORM OF FBI INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS (1979).
135. For general discussions of the historical background of the doctrine of executive privi-
lege, see R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PIVvILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH (1974); Cox, Executive
Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1383 (1974).
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tion more frequently than any previous administration. 36 Moreover,
under President Nixon assertions of the privilege assumed their most
extended form. Attorney General Kleindienst, in testimony before a
Senate committee, argued that executive privilege insulated the testi-
mony and documents of all employees of the executive branch-some
2.5 million persons-and that the privilege could be invoked even
against an impeachment inquiry and even with respect to alleged crimi-
nal activities by the President or his advisers.137
The doctrine of executive privilege has implications for the claims
of presidential power reviewed above. First, executive privilege could
be invoked to insulate the President's formulation of general policies
from scrutiny and evaluation by Congress and the electorate. In some
instances, the doctrine and the entire system of executive secrecy may
even protect the President from disclosing that a basic choice of policy
has been made. 38 If the executive can conceal important policy deci-
sions, the opportunity for unilateral executive action is substantially
broadened.' 39
136. Berger, How the Privilegefor Governmental Information Met Its Watergate, 25 CASE W.
RES. L. Rav. 747, 775 (1975). By Nixon's third Year in office "Congress was in fact being denied a
vast amount of information that it sought from the executive branch." P. KURLAND, supra note 7,
at 42. Much of this information was denied without a clear claim of executive privilege. Develop-
ments in the Law-the National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1130, 1215
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Developments-National Security]. At one point, the Defense Depart-
ment in November 1969 denied Senator Fulbright's request for a copy of the Pentagon Papers to
assist the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in its review of Vietnam policy. R. BEROER, supra
note 135, at 282 & n.11.
137. R. BERGER, supra note 135, at 254-64; P. KURLAND, supra note 7, at 43-46. It has been
suggested that these contentions may have been "tactical moves to frustrate the Watergate investi-
gations." Schwartz, Bad Presidents Make Hard Law: Richardf. Nixon in the Supreme Court, 31
RUTGERS L. REv. 22,27 (1977). President Nixon made such a claim of privilege when he refused
to transmit material to the House Judiciary Committee for use in its impeachment investigation.
Nixon's refusal formed the basis of one of three impeachment counts approved by the committee.
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON, PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES, H.R. REP. No. 1305, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 206-13 (1974).
138. The American bombing of Cambodia, for example, was a basic choice of policy that the
administration concealed from Congress and the electorate for a substantial period. Polak, supra
note 12, at 1328-38; see Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1316-17 (2d Cir. 1973) (Oakes, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974). The Central Intelligence Agency also conducted
hostilities in Laos for a decade without public disclosure. See W. COLBY & P. FORBATH, supra
note 32, at 191-202; Branfman, The President's Secret Army: A Case Study--the CI4 in Laos,
1962-1972, in THE CIA FILE 46-78 (R. Borosage & J. Marks eds. 1976). During the war in South-
east Asia there were frequent complaints that "[o]ne of the greatest problems [Congress has] today
... is getting information as to what the executive is really doing. We have extreme difficulty in
finding out what is going on." War Powers Hearings, supra note 7, at 318 (remarks of Sen. Ful-
bright). See also Berger, supra note 32, at 33-34 (noting the State Department's refusal to disclose
the terms of certain executive agreements).
139. See, eg., Cox, supra note 135, at 1431.
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Even if the presidential choice of policy is known, executive privi-
lege may allow the President to withhold factual information relating
to the matter about which the decision was made. Such withholding of
information insulates executive policies from informed criticism and
evaluation, 140 and in addition may encourage citizens to accept presi-
dential choices on the ground that the decisions must have been based
on information that, were it known, would provide satisfactory justifi-
cation. 141
Equally significant are the implications of the doctrine of execu-
tive privilege when it is applied to information about executive actions
that may threaten the constitutional rights of individuals. If, for exam-
ple, the government, without a warrant, taps the telephones of a disfa-
vored political group, or undertakes searches or burglaries for political
purposes, executive privilege might protect the executive from disclos-
ing that such an infringement has occurred. 142 The privilege might also
insulate executive officers from legal redress by the victim of the in-
fringement.' 43
Indeed, the President attempted a related type of concealment in
the litigation that culminated in United States v. Nixon, 44 the decision
that led to the disclosure of incriminating White House tape recordings
140. For example, one commentator noted that "as the Pentagon papers demonstrate, knowl-
edge of these [intragovemnmental] policy debates and the dissents from the intelligence agencies
[disclosed in the papers] might have given Congress and the public a different attitude toward the
publicly announced decisions of the successive administrations." THE PENTAGON PAPERS xli
(New York Times ed. 1971) (introduction by Neil Sheehan). See generally Developments-Na-
tional Security, supra note 136, at 1215-16; see also D. ELLSBERG, PAPERS ON THE WAR 42-135
(1972).
141. This mode of argument was often employed during the Vietnam War. See Mikva &
Lundy, The 91st Congress and the Constitution, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 449, 489 n.119 (1971). See also
War Powers Hearings, supra note 7, at 437-39 (testimony of George Reedy).
The assertion of executive privilege also impairs the ability of Congress to monitor the execu-
tive's implementation of congressional policies. Of course, the entire apparatus of executive se-
crecy impairs the ability of Congress to make law with adequate information and an
understanding of the relevant problems. See War Powers Hearings, supra note 7, at 600 (testi-
mony of Sen. Eagleton); Developments-National Security, supra note 136, at 1211-12.
142. Furthermore, an assertion of the privilege against Congress may conceal the extent of
executive activity potentially infringing constitutional rights. See, e.g., the remarks of Senator
Ervin and others on the Army's refusal to permit testimony by officers who actually directed the
Army's surveillance of political activity. 1971 Data Bank Hearings, supra note 84, at 895-96; Exec-
utive Privilege Hearings, supra note 9, at 5-6 (letters of officials of the Department of Defense),
381-91 (testimony of Sen. Tunney). See also United States v. AT & T Co., 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir.
1976).
143. See, eg, Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978), in which the closely-related privi-
lege for "state secrets" was held to protect executive officials from disclosing whether the National
Security Agency had intercepted the plaintiffs' international wire, cable, and telephone messages,
even though the interceptions may have violated the plaintiffs' first and fourth amendment rights.
144. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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and to the resignation of the President. The presidential tapes con-
firmed that White House officials, including the President, had at-
tempted to conceal the connection of administration personnel with
warrantless breakings and enterings, apparently undertaken for the
purpose of political surveillance, at the headquarters of the Democratic
National Committee in the Watergate office building. When the grand
jury and the Watergate Special Prosecutor subpoenaed the tape record-
ings for use in the Watergate cover-up investigation and trial, the Presi-
dent countered that his constitutional position and role permitted him
to withhold the tapes.145
In the federal courts, arguments that the President should not have
to deliver the tapes took two principal forms. First, President Nixon
asserted that the tapes were in his custody and that as President he was
completely immune from judicial process. 146 It was this argument in
particular that made the President appear to be claiming that he was
above the law; the argument conceded, however, that after leaving of-
fice, by impeachment or otherwise, the President would be subject to
judicial process. 147 Second, the President contended that even if he was
subject to judicial process, confidential communications to him were
absolutely privileged. The privilege was necessary, he stated, to en-
courage candid advice by presidential advisers, who might temper their
opinions if they believed that their words would become public. Fur-
thermore, Nixon contended that whether the privilege should apply in
145. The Watergate Special Prosecutors made two separate attempts to obtain presidential
tape recordings. First, Archibald Cox sought tape recordings and other material for presentation
to the Watergate grand jury. The district court's order requiring production of the material was
upheld by the court of appeals and Nixon did not seek review in the Supreme Court. In re Grand
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Issued to Richard M. Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C.), modifedsub
non Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In the second case, Leon Jaworski sought
additional documents and tape recordings for use as evidence in the cover-up trial. It was the
district court's order in this case that was affirmed by the Supreme Court. United States v. Mitch-
ell, 377 F. Supp. 1326 (D.D.C.), af'd sub nonr United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
146. Brief in Opposition at 3, In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Issued to Richard M.
Nixon, 360 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1973), modofedsub nona Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir.
1973); see In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Issued to Richard M. Nixon, 360 F. Supp. at
7 n.17 (quoting the oral argument of Charles Alan Wright). This argument mirrored President
Nixon's publicly expressed view "that the President is not subject to compulsory process from the
courts." Id at 3.
147. The President argued that a court would disrupt the functioning of the executive branch
if it issued compulsory process against the Chief Executive, because process could ultimately be
enforceable only by putting the President in jail. See Brief in Opposition, supra note 146, at 30.
This claim of presidential immunity was considered and rejected in litigation concerning the
White House tapes sought by Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum Issued to Richard M. Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1, 6-10 (D.D.C.), modifled sub nom.
Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 708-12 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The argument was not pressed in the
subsequent tapes litigation initiated by Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski and was rejected, at least
by implication, in the Court's opinion in United States v. Nixon. See 418 U.S. at 705-07.
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a particular instance was a decision for the President and that this de-
termination was not reviewable by the courts. This argument invokes
elements of the political question doctrine in yet another context.
48
The Supreme Court rejected the President's arguments, though by
no means unequivocally. 149 The Court concluded that the Constitution
does provide for a "presumptive" privilege of confidentiality, protect-
ing conversations between the President and his advisers, but that the
privilege should not prevail in the situation at issue. The Court bal-
anced the constitutional privilege against the need for the information
and found that because the information on the tapes was sought for use
in a criminal trial and did not pertain to military or diplomatic secrets,
the need for the information outweighed the privilege of confidential-
ity.' 50 The Court therefore affirmed the district court's order requiring
the President to produce the requested tapes for in camera review; this
order led to President Nixon's resignation shortly after the Supreme
Court's decision.' 5 ' Although the judgment against the President was
spectacular, both as an event in contemporary history and as a step in
constitutional development, the constitutional doctrine of executive
privilege that the Court established might well protect a future Presi-
dent from having to disclose similar material to a congressional com-
mittee, to a court in a civil case, or to government agencies. The need
for evidence of presidential conversations in criminal cases, after all,
may well be exceptional.' 5 2
148. In United States v. Nixon lawyers for the President also argued that the controversy be-
tween the Watergate Special Prosecutor and the President was a dispute "between two entities
within the executive branch of the government," and therefore was not justiciable. Brief for Re-
spondent, Cross-Petitioner Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, at 27-48, United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), reprinted in 79 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 43, at 504-25.
See 418 U.S. at 692-97.
149. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703-07. For general discussions of the case see
Freund, Foreword- On Presidential Privilege, 88 HARV. L. REV. 13 (1974); Symposiunr United
States v. Nixon, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1 (1974).
150. 418 U.S. at 706-13. As a preliminary matter the Court also held that the judiciary, not the
executive, was empowered to determine whether the privilege prevailed in the particular instance.
The applicability of the political question doctrine in this context was thus denied. See id at 703-
05.
151. The Court issued its opinion on July 24, 1974; Nixon resigned on August 9.
152. See 418 U.S. at 711-13. With respect to the perhaps unique Nixon records, however, two
claims of presidential privilege have been rejected since President Nixon left office. Nixon v.
Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (upholding provisions of the Presidential Re-
cordings and Materials Preservation Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2107, 3315-3324 (1976), and requiring gov-
ernment custody of Nixon's presidential papers and tape recordings); Dellums v. Powell, 561 F.2d
242 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 880 (1977) (upholding a subpoena of Nixon's tape record-
ings for use in a civil action filed against former Attorney General Mitchell by persons arrested in
the 1971 "May Day" demonstrations). But see Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign
Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (refusing to order the President to deliver
Watergate tape recordings to the Ervin Committee).
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The equivocal rejection of presidential claims in United States v.
Nixon seems to be characteristic of cases in which the Court confronts
sweeping assertions of executive power.153 Even when the decision is
against the President, the Court often makes significant concessions to
the executive's claims. Thus, in the Pentagon Papers case,'5 4 even
though the Court refused to enjoin publication, it was implied that a
stronger factual case might have empowered the President, without any
legislation, to secure an injunction against the newspapers. 55 Simi-
larly, in the Keith case 56 the Court did not foreclose the possibility that
the President may have the power to impose warrantless wiretaps in the
area of foreign national security.' 57 Moreover, the Court has declined
to prohibit warrantless Army surveillance of public political activity
even though there is no legislative authority for such a practice.' 5" The
Nixon case itself echoes these decisions by according constitutional sta-
tus to a "presumptive" presidential privilege of confidentiality.
Indeed, notwithstanding that the judiciary and Congress have
trimmed some of the broadest claims of presidential authority, the ex-
ecutive branch may retain significant unilateral power, including power
to act without legislative authority against individuals under circum-
stances in which constitutional rights may be affected. Presidents since
Nixon have continued to assert this power, 5 9 and recent developments
in foreign and domestic affairs are likely to occasion the assertion of
even more vigorous executive claims. Confrontations between execu-
tive power and individual liberty therefore not only remain possible
but also, given the pressures of the President's office, seem very likely to
recur. In consequence, it will be valuable to examine the dangers tradi-
tionally thought to be presented by executive power in general, and to
focus particularly on the manner in which executive action without
statutory authority poses serious dangers to individual constitutional
rights. This examination may lead to a deepened understanding of
153. See generally UNITED STATES V. NIXON: THE PRESIDENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
xix (L. Friedman ed. 1974) (introductory essay by A. Westin).
154. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). See text accompanying notes
33-59 supra.
155. 403 U.S. 713, 730 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 725-27 (Brennan, J., concurring); see
Cox, Foreword- Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1, 7 (1980). See
also text accompanying notes 287-302 infra.
156. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972). See text accompanying
notes 76-104 supra.
157. See note 101 supra and accompanying text. Note, however, the limitations imposed by
Congress in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2511, 2518, 2519 (Supp. 1979).
158. See text accompanying notes 109-34 supra.
159. See text accompanying notes 101-04 supra.
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how the judiciary should review claims of executive authority when
those claims threaten the constitutional liberties of individuals.
III. Two TYPES OF EXECUTIVE ACTION
Sweeping power reposed in a single executive official has often
been viewed as a severe danger to liberty. 160 Whether or not contem-
porary presidents have attempted anything that could fairly be termed
tyranny or dictatorship, the recent claims of presidential authority that
we have reviewed may be illuminated by examining why the specter of
excessive executive power has often evoked fear.' 61 This article earlier
distinguished actions of the Nixon administration that made general
economic or social policy from actions without a general rule that
threatened to invade constitutional rights.162 In section IV, we will re-
turn to the problem of the implications of unauthorized executive ac-
tion for individual constitutional rights, and the relation of this
problem to the doctrine of separation of powers. In this section, how-
ever, we examine a preliminary theoretical difference that may be valu-
able for an understanding of the issues discussed in section IV: the
distinction between executive lawmaking in the form of general rules
and executive action directed against specific individuals in the absence
of general rules set down in advance.
A. Dangers of Executive Lawmaking in the Form of General Rules or
Policies.
The first type of action is the executive's formulation of general
rules or policies for the governance of society-rules that may be
160. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century libertarian publicists vividly described the dangers
of executive tyranny. See, e.g., J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ch. XVIII,
§ 199, at 416-17 (P. Laslett ed. 1960) ("ryranny is the exercise of Power beyond Right. . .[w]hen
the Govemour, however, intitled, makes not the Law, but his Will, the Rule; and his Commands
and Actions are not directed to the preservation of the Properties of his People, but the satisfaction
of his own Ambition, Revenge, Covetousness, or any other irregular Passion"); C. MONTESQUIEU,
THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS bk. II, ch. 1, at 9 (D. Appleton ed. 1900) ("[A] despotic government [is]
that in which a single person directs everything by his own will and caprice"). See generally B.
BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION ch. III (1967); G. WOOD,
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 18-45 (1969). See also J. ROUSSEAU,
THE SOCALI CONTRACT 133-34 (Penguin ed. 1968). For expressions of the view that the legisla-
ture might also act tyrannically, see, e.g., T. JEFFERSON, 3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
224 (P. Ford ed. 1894) ("123 despots would surely be as oppressive as one").
161. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) ("It is absurd to see a dictator in a representative product of the sturdy democratic
traditions of the Mississippi Valley. The accretion of dangerous power does not come in a day. It
does come, however slowly, from the generative force of unchecked disregard of the restrictions
that fence in even the most disinterested assertion of authority").
162. See text accompanying notes 70-72 supra.
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promulgated, like statutes, in general form and in advance of applica-
tion, for example, by executive order. Rules or policies in this category
do not necessarily threaten the liberties of individuals; the category in-
cludes rules that would be clearly constitutional had Congress rather
than the President adopted them (such as a reduction in expenditures
for a social program or the creation of a tariff surcharge). 63
The clearest danger in executive action of this sort is that the exec-
utive may disregard the wishes or interests of the people. Lawmaking
contrary to the desires or interests of the majority is one of the classic
forms of tyranny, and has often been perceived as resulting from execu-
tive rule. As one colonial writer remarked, "Tyranny [is] nothing else
but the government of one man, or a few, over many, against their
inclination and interest."' 64
Instances of a single individual or small group governing an un-
willing populace by force make manifest the danger of executive law-
making. Even when an executive is elected, however, there is the
possibility of this kind of abuse. Indeed it appears that it is primarily to
avoid this danger and to enhance majority rule that the Constitution
entrusts basic lawmaking power to Congress rather than to the Presi-
dent. 65 Congress is a numerous body whose members represent dis-
tinct, relatively compact constituencies, and therefore are likely to
reflect the wishes and interests of the people within those districts with
some accuracy. 166 The original theory of the Framers apparently was
that a legislature reproduces as closely as possible a meeting of the citi-
163. For examples of executive action in this category, see text accompanying notes 172-75
infra.
164. 0. NOBLE, SOME STRICTURES UPON THE SACRED STORY RECORDED IN THE BOOK OF
ESTHER .... at 5 (Newburyport 1775), quoted in G. WOOD, supra note 160, at 22-23. For a
distinction between "desires" and "interests" in the theory of representation, see Pennock, Political
Representatior" An Overview, in REPRESENTATION 12-14 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1968). It
is frequently argued that the desires and interests of the populace may not always coincide. See,
eg., . PENNOCK, DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL THEORY 260, 264-65 (1979).
165. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 1. Although the President's veto power constitutes a share of law-
making authority, the veto is a negative check, which does not confer affirmative legislative power.
Moreover, the veto can be overridden by Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. On the other hand,
the threat of a veto may, as a practical matter, give the President power in the shaping of congres-
sional policy. B. ECKHARDT & C. BLACK, THE TIDES OF POWER 57-65 (1976).
166. Madison remarked in the Constitutional Convention that "[i]t was a provision every
where established that the Country should be divided into districts & representatives taken from
each, in order that the Legislative Assembly might equally understand & sympathize, with the
rights of the people in every part of the Community." 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 124 (1937). See also THE FEDERALIST Nos. 56 (J. Madison),
58 (J. Madison); cf. C. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 160, bk. XI, ch. V, at 185-86 (representatives
should be elected locally rather than "chosen from the general body of the nation"),
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zens themselves. 167 From a clash of views that resembles the clash of
interests within the country there will emerge a result closely attuned to
the wishes of the populace. 68
In contrast, it can be argued, the executive-a single individual-
cannot possibly reflect the electorate's wishes as fully as the members of
a legislature. As a result there is a greater likelihood that presidential
policy choices will deviate from the popular will.1 69 Moreover, an indi-
vidual may be governed by aberrant, whimsical, or self-interested
views that could not prevail in a collegial assembly. 170 Finally, deci-
sions by a single individual or a small group may not involve the care-
ful deliberation that occurs in congressional debate and that increases
the likelihood that the desires and interests of the populace win be ac-
curately perceived.171
President Nixon took a variety of actions that posed the dangers to
majority rule inherent in executive policy-making absent authorization
by a representative body. For example, he sought to impound funds
for legislative programs established by Congress and on occasion at-
167. See 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 166, at 561; THE FEDERALIST No. 52 (J. Madison) (indi-
cating that "[t]he scheme of representation [is] a substitute for a meeting of the citizens in per-
son").
168. Moreover, the process of legislative deliberation may help to make well-considered deci-
sions and to accommodate the wishes of defeated minorities.
For a critical analysis of the extent to which Congress actually reflects majority views, see
Choper, The Supreme Court and the Political Branches.: Democratic Theory and Practice, 122 U.
PA. L. REv. 810 (1974); cf. Stewart, Foreword- Lawyers and the Legislative Process, 10 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 151, 166-74 (1973) (emphasizing the limitations of "Congress' lawmaking capabilities").
169. See, eg., Bickel, Congress the President and the Power to Wage War, 48 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 131, 143-44 (1971); Gewirtz, The Courts, Congress, and Executive Policy-Making: Notes on
Three Doctrines, LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Summer, 1976, at 46, 47; Cf. J. SALOMA, CONGRESS
AND THE NEW POLICS 101 (1962) (arguing that Congress is more responsive than the President
because elected more frequently).
It has been argued, however, that "[i]n the exercise of the veto power ... it often happens
that the President more truly represents the entire country than does the majority vote of the two
Houses." W. TAFT, THE PRESIDENT AND His POWERS 18 (1967). See also Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52, 123 (1926). Others have seen in the President "the prime organ of a compensating
'national spirit'," redressing the "local spirit" said to be characteristic of Congress. See Black,
supra note 32, at 851; Wechsler, The Political Safeguards ofFederalism, in PRINCIPLES, POLITICS
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 49,64 (1961). See also T. ROOSEVELT, AtrrOBIOGRAPHY 282, quotedin
E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT:. OFFICE AND POWERS 265 (1957). This view of the representative
nature of the presidency has received strong support over the past few decades. See Van Alstyne,
The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers ofthe President and of the Federal Courts:
. Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping Clause, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB., Spring,
1976, at 102, 104-05.
170. See notes 240-41 infra and accompanying text.
171. The bicameral nature of Congress, which often requires two distinct sets of committee
hearings and floor debates, may further enhance the quality of legislative deliberation. See, e.g.,
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 576 (1964).
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tempted to destroy those programs.' 72 Furthermore, he imposed eco-
nomic regulations based on tenuous statutory authority. 173 In foreign
affairs, presidential action in undertaking armed hostilities without a
congressional declaration of war also falls into this category.' 74 The
conduct of secret wars and other covert foreign campaigns by executive
bodies such as the Central Intelligence Agency similarly threatened to
undermine the principle of majority rule. 175
That policy-making of this sort primarily threatens majority
rulemaking suggests that the process of majority rule itself might some-
times be relied on to redress the balance.' 76 Thus, it has recently been
argued, for example, that all of the disputes discussed in this section
should be found nonjusticiable political questions if the President
claims that his action rests on independent constitutional authority.177
Whether or not such a sweeping conclusion is justified, it is arguable
that issues of this kind do not require extraordinary judicial solicitude.
172. See notes 60-67 supra and accompanying text.
173. See United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding that the
presidential 10% import duty surcharge is authorized by the Trading with the Enemy Act, 50
U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1976)); cf. Consumers Union v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975) (upholding "voluntary" agreements between the State Department
and foreign steel corporations, limiting the amount of steel exported to the United States). For
similar action taken by President Carter, see AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 888 (1979) (upholding an executive order denying government contracts to com-
panies failing to observe presidential wage and price standards).
174. See, e.g., J. MADISON, Letters of Helvidius, in 6 THE WRITINGs OF JAMES MADISON 145
(G. Hunt ed. 1906) (declaration of war as lawmaking).
175. See note 32 supra. The presidential practice of entering into international "executive
agreements" may pose related dangers, as it establishes policy without legislative participation, in
the form of senatorial advice and consent, which is constitutionally required for treaties. See U.S.
CoNsr. art. IL § 2, cl. 2.
Madison argued that the adoption of an agreement between nations must be viewed as law-
making and, therefore, as an essentially legislative function:
A treaty is not an execution of laws: it does not presuppose the existence of laws. It is,
on the contrary, to have itself the force of a law, and to be carried into execution, like all
other laws, by the executive magistrate. To say then that the power of making treaties,
which are confessedly laws, belongs naturally to the department which is to execute laws,
is to say, that the executive department naturally includes a legislative power. In theory
this is an absurdity-in practice a tyranny.
J. MADISON, supra note 174, at 145 (emphasis in original). But see A. HAMILTON, Pacficus No. I,
in XV THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33-43 (H. Syrett ed. 1969). Notwithstanding
Madison's position, executive agreements connected with the recognition of a foreign nation have
been found constitutional and held to override inconsistent state law. See United States v. Pink,
315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); cf. Goldwater v. Carter, 444
U.S. 996, 1007 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (expressing the view that unilateral termination of
a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan is within presidential power as a "necessary incident to
Executive recognition of the Peking Government...").
176. See generally Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control fthe Execu.
tive, 63 CAL. L. Rav. 983 (1975) (discussing legislative veto).
177. J. CHraoPE, supra note 10, at 275.
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As long as the executive rule does not endanger specific constitutional
liberties, the primary judicial function of protecting minority rights
against majority oppression 178 is not implicated.
B. Dangers of Executive Action Against Specfc Individuals Without
a General Rule.
A second type of executive action occurs when the executive acts
against specific individuals in the absence of any general rule set forth
in advance. 179 The danger of executive action of the second type is
more subtle, and quite possibly more serious, than that of the first.
Here the principal hazard is not simply that the executive's policy may
contravene the wishes of the majority, but rather that the opportunity
for arbitrary or discriminatory action against disfavored individuals is
greatly expanded.180
According to two writers who have greatly influenced the develop-
ment of American constitutional theory, tyranny is typified by action of
an executive official unrestrained by law. Montesquieu defined a des-
potic government as one in which a single individual acting without
law "directs every thing by his own will and caprice,"'' and asserted
that the essence of political liberty was the individual's right to be ruled
by law.182 This view of tyranny is also embodied in Locke's famous
178. Id. ch. 2.
179. In some instances the distinction between the promulgation of a general rule and the
taking of specific action in the absence of a general rule may be difficult to draw. Even a single
action by the executive may follow an unspoken executive policy; in this sense almost any execu-
tive action may be said to presuppose some implicit executive rule of policy. Conversely, it may
be unclear whether a promulgated rule is general. It is possible, for example, to draft a statute that
refers to no individual by name but can by its terms apply to only one person. See, e.g., I.R.C.
§ 1240 ("Louis B. Mayer Provision") (repealed 1976). Moreover, it might be argued that a given
rule, though covering a large number of persons whose identities are not known in advance, may
nonetheless be lacking in generality because it fails to include other cases which, it is thought, a
rule of that sort should cover. Cf. F. HAYEK, THE CoNsTITUrloN OF LIBERTY 278-79 (1960)
(arguing that special rules for labor picketing and closed- and union-shop contracts constitute an
"exemption" of unions "from the general rules of law"). In this article, however, "general rule"
refers to a promulgated norm of conduct that is prospective in application, covers a substantial
number of cases, and applies to individuals whose identities are not clearly known in advance.
180. See notes 198-208 infra and accompanying text.
181. See C. MoNTESQuIEU, supra note 160, bk. II, ch. I, at 9. See also id. bk. VIII, ch. V, at
137 ("when [reigning families] do not observe [the laws], it is a despotic state swayed by a great
many despotic princes").
182. To Montesquieu liberty "consists... of being governed by laws and of knowing that the
laws will not arbitrarily be put on one side." R. SHACKLETON, MONTESQUIEU: A CRITICAL BIOG-
RAPHY 287 (1961). See, e.g., C. MONTESQuiEU, supra note 160, bk. XI, ch. IV, at 180-81:
Liberty is a right of doing whatever the laws permit ....
To prevent [the abuse of power], it is necessary from the very nature of things that
power should be a check to power. A government may be so constituted as no man shall
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remark that "Where-ever Law ends, Tyranny begins .... ,,ts3 Locke's
comments on the nature of political liberty reflect the same underlying
opinion:
Freedom of Men under Government, is, to have a standing Rule to
live by, common to every one of that Society, and made by the Legis-
lative Power erected in it; A Liberty to follow my own Will in all
things, where the Rule prescribes not; and not to be subject to the
inconstant, uncertain, unknown, Arbitrary Will of another Man.
18 4
An important function of the separation of executive and legisla-
tive powers is to prevent this form of tyranny, for the opportunity for
such tyrannical action is increased by the amalgamation of governmen-
tal functions in the same person or group. If the executive must act in
accordance with general rules set down in advance by others, the exec-
utive's opportunities for arbitrary action are reduced. But when legisla-
tive and executive functions are performed by the same organ-
particularly if that organ is an individual-the opportunities for arbi-
trary or discriminatory action are significantly increased.' 85 Such a
government is thus tyrannous or despotic even if the majority favors it.
Some of the most conspicuous legal claims of the Nixon adminis-
tration evoked concerns of this type, as the administration sought to
unite legislative and executive functions, and eliminate judicial review,
in certain areas. It was an amalgamation of power of this kind that the
be compelled to do things to which the law does not oblige him, nor forced to abstain
from things which the law permits.
See also id. bk. XI, ch. IV, at 182; id. bk. VI, ch. I, at 90 ("Despotic power is self-sufficient; round
it there is an absolute vacuum. Hence it is that when travellers favour us with the description of
countries where arbitrary sway prevails, they seldom make mention of civil laws"). According to
Montesquieu, the restraints of law promote a sense of security in the individual by removing his
fear of unpredictable governmental action. Id. 90-91.
183. J. LocKE, supra note 160, ch. XVIII, § 202, at 418.
184. Id. ch. II, § 22, at 302 (emphasis omitted). But see id. ch. XIV (acknowledging executive
prerogative), and Madison's dour response: "[Locke's] chapter on prerogative shows, how much
the reason of the philosopher was clouded by the royalism of the Englishman." J. MADISON,
supra note 174, at 144 n.l.
Other writers share a similar view of the characteristics of liberty. See, e.g., P. KURLAND,
supra note 7, at 219 (views of Voltaire); 5f. F. NEUMANN, THE DEMocRATIC AND THE AuTHORI-
TAR AN STATE 244 (Free Press ed. 1957) ("mhe power of executive agencies in totalitarian states
to interfere at discretion with life, liberty and property may be taken as the best-known feature of
this kind of dictatorship"). See also J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 38, at 235 (1971)
("[Riegular and impartial administration of public rules [is] closely related to liberty").
185. W. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POwERS 128 n.l (1965). See also F.
NEUMANN, supra note 184, at 158, 164-67. For a fuller discussion of this point, see notes 198-208
infra and accompanying text. Madison may have had this type of arbitrary, lawless action in
mind in the 47th Federalist Paper when, relying on Montesquieu, he remarked, "The accumula-
tion of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few,
or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the defini-
tion of tyranny." THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 228 (J. Madison) (1837 ed.); see C. MoNTESQuInu,
supra note 160, bk. XI, ch. V, at 182-83.
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President sought in the Pentagon Papers case,186 as the Government
tried to restrain publication of specific material by specific newspapers,
based not on a general legislative determination that certain categories
of speech should be restrained, but on an executive finding in the par-
ticular case that publication of the Pentagon Papers would be unduly
dangerous. Although the executive sought judicial action, instead of
proceeding in a purely executive manner by ordering federal officers to
seize the presses, the Government argued that the court should accept
the executive's judgment that the publication should be enjoined with
little independent judicial scrutiny. 8 7 Similarly, in the Keith case38
the executive claimed the power to determine, without a general legis-
lative rule, the sorts of information that should be subject to wiretap-
ping and other surveillance, and to act accordingly against individuals
without significant judicial review. 189 Furthermore, in its claims that
the Army could undertake political surveillance without specific statu-
tory authorization or judicial review, the executive again sought to
unite all governmental powers in its hands and to make decisions relat-
ing to individuals in accordance with effectively unchecked executive
will.'90 These assertions, consequently, raised justifiable concerns
about this second form of "tyrannical" action.
Locke and Montesquieu discussed the dangers of this type of exec-
utive action long before the framing of the Constitution. Yet executive
action of this kind, by its very nature, poses dangers to constitutional
liberties. To the extent that executive action without legislative rule
expands the opportunity for political retaliation or discriminatory ac-
tions, such executive action endangers specific guarantees of the Con-
stitution. It is to the relationship between executive power and the
threat to constitutional liberties that we now turn.
IV. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE PROTECTION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
We have thus far explored the dangers of executive power in two
areas: the creation of general rules of law by the executive, which
threatens the processes of majority rulemaking and consent, and the
application of executive power to individuals without guidance from
any rule set out in advance, which increases the chance of arbitrary or
discriminatory action. Unique problems arise, however, when execu-
186. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
187. See notes 40-44 supra and accompanying text.
188. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
189. See notes 77-83 supra and accompanying text.
190. See notes 109-34 supra and accompanying text.
Vol. 1981:1]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1981:1
tive action of either category threatens to impinge on constitutional
rights.' 91 The assertion of executive power to act without legislative
guidance in ways that may affect the constitutional rights of individuals
raises concerns about the relationship between individual rights and
the separation of powers. Specifically, it stimulates reflection on
whether the constitutional requirement of congressional lawmaking has
any implications for the protection of individual rights.
Although the point has not been made explicitly in the cases, the
Supreme Court seems to have acknowledged that the requirement of
congressional lawmaking and the protection of constitutional rights are
related. For example, the Court has held that broad or implicit delega-
tions of legislative power do not authorize administrative measures that
may encroach on basic constitutional rights. Rather, the Court has re-
quired a clear congressional statement that the measures are authorized
before finding that the executive has acted within its delegated power;
only then will the Court consider the underlying constitutional ques-
tion.' 92 Although this "clear statement" doctrine has sometimes been
191. Although the instances of executive rulemaking examined above did not threaten indi-
vidual constitutional rights, an example of an executive rule that does so is discussed below in the
text accompanying notes 287-302 infra. As noted above, executive action without any general rule
promulgated in advance poses inherent dangers of action in violation of specific constitutional
rights.
192. See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958). In Kent the Court held that a broad
delegation of power to the Secretary of State to issue passports did not authorize the Secretary to
withhold a passport on the ground that the applicant was a member of or affiliated with the
Communist Party. Justice Douglas's opinion indicated that when executive action invades areas
of constitutional concern (here the right to travel and also the rights of political belief and associa-
tion) the Court will not find executive action to be authorized by Congress without explicit statu-
tory authorization. Id. at 129-30. The Court reached a similar result in Schneider v. Smith, 390
U.S. 17 (1968), in which a statute permitting the President to issue regulations "to safeguard
[merchant vessels against] sabotage or other subversive acts," id. at 18, was held not to authorize
executive inquiry into the political associations and beliefs of prospective maritime employees.
See also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 274-77 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring); Zemel v.
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 20-40 (1965) (Black, Douglas, and Goldberg, JJ., dissenting); Exparte Endo,
323 U.S. 283, 299-300 (1944); Gewirtz, supra note 169, at 74-75. One commentator has suggested
that "[t]he clear statement technique could be thought of as operating on a sliding scale: the more
vital the individual liberty infringed, the more explicit must be the expression of consent." Stew-
art, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. Rav. 1667, 1681 n.54 (1975).
The principle that delegations of legislative power should be construed narrowly in order to avoid
possible constitutional problems is closely related to the principle that ambiguous or unduly gen-
eral criminal statutes should be construed narrowly in order to avoid such problems. See, e.g.,
United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
In some decisions that find a lack of administrative authority to take measures potentially
affecting the constitutional rights of government employees or employees of government contrac-
tors, the Court has raised the possibility that the requisite authorization might come either from
Congress or from the President. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (finding no
explicit authorization by Congress or the President for a Civil Service Commission regulation
excluding all aliens from the federal service); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) (finding no
SEPARATION OF POWERS
viewed as a technique for avoiding a more intrusive judicial deci-
sion,193 it also suggests a suspicion of executive action that may affect
individual rights without the explicit guidance of Congress. 194 A re-
lated idea emerges in Justice White's concurrence in the Pentagon Pa-
pers case, in which he indicated that although the Court might have
enjoined the publication of the Pentagon Papers had Congress explic-
itly authorized the injunction, it would not do so at the President's re-
quest without such authorization.195 White's position suggests that
there must be express congressional authorization for executive action
that possibly infringes certain basic liberties before the Court will even
consider an argument that such executive action is constitutional.1 96
These cases imply that in certain instances the Court has viewed a
requirement of explicit lawmaking by Congress as a form of protection
against executive action for the constitutional rights of individuals.
The underlying rationale of this position, however, remains unclear.
There has been little analysis of how the separation of powers between
Congress and the executive, which is sometimes viewed simply as an
allocation of authority between contending units of government or con-
tending social forces, 197 assists in protecting the constitutional rights of
individuals. This section of the article undertakes such an analysis, di-
viding the issues into two parts. The first discusses the dangers to con-
stitutional rights that arise when the executive acts without prior
legislative rules. The second explains how a requirement of explicit
legislation prior to executive action in areas touching constitutional
rights can help safeguard those rights.
A. The Threat to Constitutional Rights Posed by Executive Action
Without Statutory Authorization.
1. Threats to First Amendment Rights in Executive Action Without
a GenerallRule. As we have seen, there are special dangers to individ-
ual liberty if the executive acts without any general rule set down in
congressional or presidential authorization for a Department of Defense security clearance proce-
dure that denied an employee of a government contractor the right to confront witnesses against
him).
193. See Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 26-27 (1968).
194. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 274-77 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring).
195. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730-40 (1971) (White, J., concur-
ring). See note 51 supra and accompanying text. See also L. TRIE, supra note 50, § 17-1, at 1139.
196. See Junger, supra note 50, at 38.
197. See, e.g., Franklin, The Passing of the School of Montesquieu and its System of Separation
ofJPowers, 12 TUL. L. REv. 1, 11 (1937) (viewing the modem doctrine of separation of powers as
"a system recognizing the legality of the struggle among human interests to gain control of state
power").
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advance. 198 Though the opportunity for arbitrary and ad hoc executive
action always exists, it is increased if the executive is permitted not only
to execute the law but also to make the law at the moment of execution.
The danger to constitutional rights that such action can pose is illus-
trated by examining the special case of executive retaliation against in-
dividuals for expressing their political views.
A number of the most controversial actions of the Nixon adminis-
tration endangered free political expression. 199 In some instances the
executive took action to suppress speech;2°° in others the executive took
action that did not directly curtail speech but occurred in an atmos-
phere of political hostility, raising the possibility that the action actu-
ally was taken to retaliate against offensive speech or political
activity.201 The experience of the Nixon years demonstrates that the
dangers that executive action without a prior general rule poses to
speech-related rights are particularly grave because the opportunity for
illicit action prompted by political hostility is thereby greatly increased.
This point can be most clearly seen by contrasting such executive
action with legislative rulemaking. In legislative action, the legislature
approaches problems as issues of general policy and expresses its deter-
mination in a general proposition applicable to all. In contrast, when
the executive acts against individuals without the guidance of a prior
general rule he responds to a specific event with specific individuals in
mind. In such instances the executive asks primarily how a specific
individual should be treated or a specific situation dealt with-that is,
for example, should the New York Times be censored? or should
Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatric records be obtained through a covert
search and seizure? The more general policy issues of how to handle
the problems of national-security censorship or surveillance arise only
as a by-product of deciding how to handle the specific case.20 2 Conse-
quently, when the executive makes such a decision in the absence of a
prior rule, there is a significant risk that the individual aspects of the
198. See text accompanying notes 179-90 supra.
199. See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713 (1971).
200. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
201. See note 89 supra (surveillance of dissident groups); note 88 supra (wiretapping of jour-
nalists).
202. See, e.g., President Nixon's reported instructions to Charles Colson about Ellsberg: "I
want him exposed, Chuck. I don't care how you do it. But get it done. We're going to let the
country know what kind of a 'hero' Mr. Ellsberg is.... I want those leaks stopped. Don't give
me any excuses. I want results. I want them now." H. SALISBURY, WITHoUT FEAR OR FAVOR
268 (1980).
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case will predominate over the general policy question, thus improperly
influencing the choice of policy itself.
The individual case may slant the executive's policy choice in two
ways. First, the executive official's hostility to an individual may cause
him to overestimate the danger to the government interest at stake,
leading to a more oppressive policy choice than would have been cho-
sen in the abstract. Second, the absence of a prior general rule gives
greater scope for, and thus encourages, political retaliation against dis-
favored individuals. The absence of prior general policy allows the ex-
ecutive to act against a person for impermissible political reasons and
then to rationalize that action retrospectively by invoking a plausible
neutral policy. As Judge Wright remarked, "In a system under which
government officials do not have to act in accordance with publicly
stated rules, it is very difficult to know when they are acting in accord-
ance with secret, illicit rules. '20 3
The executive's position within the federal government increases
the possibility that executive action without a general rule, potentially
infringing upon first amendment interests, will rest on illegitimate politi-
cal considerations. As the main recipient of criticism of national poli-
cies, the President is often a personal adversary of individuals or
groups politically hostile to the government. In seeking to preserve the
perceived national interest by moving against such speakers, the Presi-
dent frequently moves to preserve his own political position.20 4 Yet
there are clear dangers of illicit motivation when an actor makes ad hoc
decisions concerning measures to be taken against his own critics.205
Similarly, the executive may identify with government policies and
may feel personally attacked or threatened when those policies are dis-
paraged, even if he is not personally criticized. In a highly sensitive
individual, such political or ideological disagreement may evoke an un-
203. Wright, Book Review (K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY),
81 YALE L. J. 575, 589 (1972). Action against an individual that rests upon illicit considerations of
political retaliation itself violates the first amendment. See Quint, Toward First Amendment Limi-
tations on the Introduction of Evidence: The Problem of United States v. Rosenberg, 86 YALE L.J.
1622, 1642-43, 1652 n.101 (1977).
204. As one commentator has written in a related context:
It is easy to see how self-interest becomes equated with the national interest. As the
practical politician sees it, a discredited administration will undermine the stability of the
government and its capacity to deal effectively with problems at home and abroad. It
follows that everything must be done to protect the administration from being discred-
ited.
Clark, Holding Government Accountable: The Amended Freedom of Information Act, 84 YALE L.J.
741, 746 (1975).
205. Reliance on the conscientiousness or probity of executive officials as a safeguard against
abuses of this kind is likely to be a fragile safeguard. See notes 84-91 supra and accompanying
text. See also notes 208, 220 infra.
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reasoning response against the personality of the critic-in short, the
punishment of "enemies. ' 20 6 Although this phenomenon may have
been exaggerated under President Nixon,20 7 pressures conducive to this
attitude seem to inhere in the executive office itself.208
In sum, when the executive acts against an individual without a
general rule, he makes policy at the moment of its enforcement, and
such action involves dangers of retaliatory or distorted decisions that
may threaten first amendment interests. A central purpose of the doc-
trine that the executive should act in accordance with a prior rule is
thus to preserve the generality of lawmaking. The separation of powers
diminishes the possibility of passionate, and basically unreviewable, ad
hoc executive action against individuals because of their personal qual-
ities, including their political views.2 09 The doctrine thus interposes an
essential layer of disinterested rulemaking between the ad hominem re-
206. For example, one official described the atmosphere in the White House in 1970 in the
following language: "It didn't matter who you were or what ideological positions you took ...
You were either for us or against us, and if you were against us we were against you." J. LuKAs,
supra note 49, at 11. And Egil Krogh, co-leader of the Nixon White House's "Plumbers Unit,"
supposedly stated in 1971 that "[a]nyone who opposes us, we'll destroy. As a matter of fact, any-
one who doesn't support us, we'll destroy." Id. 68. In the course of these political skirmishes,
however, executive-branch officials may come to believe that their enemies threaten the nation.
See, e.g., J. MAGRUDER, AN AMERICAN LIFE 101 (1974) (ascribing to H.R. Haldeman the view
that Vietnam War critics were traitors).
207. See e.g., J. MAGRUDER, supra note 206, at 77 (viewing President Nixon as "a politician
who was absolutely paranoid about criticism, who took it all personally, and whose instinct was to
lash back at his critics...").
208. Other recent presidents took retaliatory action against political critics. According to the
Church Report, for example, "[i]n the 1960s President Johnson asked the FBI to compare various
Senators' statements on Vietnam with the Communist Party line and to conduct name checks on
leading antiwar Senators." CHURCH REPORT, supra note 88, bk. II, at 8 (footnotes omitted). See
also id. 116-17, 230-31 (requests of White House aides, under Johnson and Nixon, for FBI name
checks on citizens critical of Vietnam War policy). More recently, President Carter's press secre-
tary telephoned a reporter and made derogatory and apparently false statements about a senator
who opposed the administration's position on the qualifications of the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget. Powell Apologizesfor Attempting to Spread Rumor Harmful to Percy,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1977, § A, at I. Other executive agencies have also succumbed to pressures
to retaliate against political opponents. For example, an FBI official recommended the disruption
of New Left activities, noting that "the New Left has on many occasions viciously and scurrilously
attacked the Director and the Bureau in an attempt to hamper our investigations and drive us off
the college campuses." CHURCH REPORT, supra note 88, bk. II, at 72-73. See also id. 238-39
(dissemination by the FBI of derogatory information about its critics); id. 246-49.
209. In this sense the separation of powers thus tends to implement equal governmental treat-
ment of individuals. Of course even when a statute empowers the executive to act, he may enforce
the statute discriminatorily. But the danger of arbitrary executive action is substantially greater
when the executive acts against an individual without general rule, in accordance with his own ad
hoc determination of policy. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARv. L. REv. 38, 204
(1971).
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action of the executive and the offensive speaker.2t0
2. Threats to Constitutional Rights in General Posed by Executive
Action Without a Statute. Executive action without a general rule set
forth in advance poses special dangers to political expression. But, for
two principal reasons, executive action without a statute poses a more
general threat to all constitutional rights. This threat arises from two
interrelated executive tendencies: a tendency to exaggerate the strength
of the government interest that is opposed to the liberty interest, and a
correlative tendency to neglect the liberty interest itself.2 11 The central
force that furthers an exaggerated executive assessment of government
interests in comparison with individual rights is the executive's role as
symbol of the government and as advocate of the governmental inter-
est. The President has the constitutional responsibility to represent the
government interest in general; subordinate figures such as officials of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Defense
assert the government interest in their particular fields of responsibility.
Because these individuals represent and in many cases identify with the
government, there is an undue danger that they will inflate the govern-
ment interest to its maximum possible value and will quite possibly
overvalue it.212 It was in this sense that Justice Brennan remarked, in
considering a conflict between the national-security interest and the in-
terest in the freedom of association, that the judgment of the Secretary
of Defense, "colored by his overriding obligation to protect the na-
tional defense, is not a constitutionally acceptable substitute for Con-
210. A related requirement of explicit legislative rulemaking has been imposed when the
Supreme Court has refused to permit state officials to act under statutes that are vague or that
grant officials broad discretion to take action that may infringe first amendment interests. See,
e.g., Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974). The
Court has found that a grant of unchanneled discretion unduly increases the risk that the execu-
tive may suppress speech because of its content. See Quint, supra note 203, at 1652 n.101 (1977);
Note, The First fAmendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844, 872-73 (1970).
In theory the dangers of arbitrary executive action of the type discussed in this section might
be diminished by an executive rule promulgated in advance, which, if observed, might restrict
executive discretion. It is desirable, however, that such a rule should have the stability of a statute,
rather than the uncertainty of an executive rule that the executive itself may change or manipu-
late. The next section discusses why executive action without statute, in any form, even the pro-
mulgation of an executive rule, may pose dangers to constitutionally protected interests.
211. Furthermore, these reasons apply for the most part to the executive promulgation of a
general rule potentially threatening constitutional rights, see text accompanying notes 287-302
infra, in addition to executive action undertaken without any promulgated rule.
212. Many fourth amendment decisions have acknowledged this tendency in the case of law
enforcement officers. See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948); Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948). Recent history indicates that this tendency does not
significantly weaken as one proceeds up the hierarchy of executive officials. See United States v.
United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1972). See note 99 .supra.
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gress' judgment, in the absence of further, limiting guidance. '21 3
In addition to this inherent structural bias, the history of the John-
son and Nixon administrations indicates that the upper echelons of the
executive branch may feel under seige from hostile outsiders, and may
operate in an atmosphere in which anxieties over secrecy and national
security predominate over other concerns. A balanced view of the gov-
ernment interest may be difficult to achieve in such a charged atmos-
phere. Moreover, the pressure to make quick decisions may amplify
the bias in favor of the government interest. Officials generally predis-
posed toward the government interest will be likely, in moments of un-
certainty and stress, to err in favor of the Government. 21 4 Actions so
taken, even if reconsidered in a cooler atmosphere, may be difficult to
undo.
Though it is the function of counsel and debate to mitigate the
danger that decision-makers will act on exaggerated or idiosyncratic
fears, nothing in the structure of the executive office requires such de-
bate.215 Executive decisions, particularly when national security is
thought to be at issue, may be made by a small group of hierarchically
arranged officials, often working in secret. The isolation of the oval
213. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 276-77 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring).
214. Such a process may have been at work, for example, in the Pentagon Papers case. See
notes 218, 244 infra and text accompanying note 218 infra.
215. For an important discussion of the isolation of the presidential office, and the risk that
proposed executive action will receive little significant debate, see generally G. REEDY, THE Twi-
LIGHT OF THE PRESIDENCY (1970). Reedy argues that once it appears that the president favors a
course of action, his advisers are not likely to challenge or criticize the proposed action:
White House councils are not debating matches in which ideas emerge from the heated
exchanges of participants. The council centers around the president himself, to whom
everyone addresses his observations.
The first strong observations to attract the favor of the president become subcon-
sciously the thoughts of everyone in the room. The focus of attention shifts from a test-
ing of all concepts to a groping for means of overcoming the difficulties. A thesis which
could not survive an undergraduate seminar in a liberal-arts college becomes accepted
doctrine, and the only question is not whether it should be done but how it should be
done.
Id. 12-13 (emphasis in original). See also note 217 infra and accompanying text.
Another close observer of the Executive has similarly remarked: "Personalities change when
the President is present, and frequently even strong men make recommendations on the basis of
what they believe the President wishes to hear." R. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS 33 (1969). Ken-
nedy adds that conflict and debate are frequently absent when the President receives advice:
His office creates such respect and awe that it has almost a cowering effect on men.
Frequently I saw advisers adapt their opinions to what they believed President Kennedy
and, later, President Johnson wished to hear.
I once attended a preliminary meeting with a Cabinet officer, where we agreed on a
recommendation to be made to the President. It came as a slight surprise to me when, a
few minutes later, in the meeting with the President himself, the Cabinet officer vigor-
ously and fervently expressed the opposite point of view, which, from the discussion, he
quite accurately learned would be more sympathetically received by the President.
Id. 112.
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Fear of domestic unrest, if well founded, is a legitimate ground for
action. The Army's surveillance of political groups, however, may
have actually resulted in part from the fear that certain vocal individu-
als or groups espoused political views contrary to the Army's long-
range interests.220 This fear-based on the Army's desire to protect its
own political interests-is an illegitimate ground for government action
and would never have withstood public and congressional scrutiny.
But much secret executive activity, undertaken without statutory au-
thority, seems to have occurred under President Nixon for a similar
illicit reason: to protect the political interests of the executive. Such
actions of the Nixon administration as maintaining warrantless wire-
taps on political opponents, 221 breaking into the Watergate office, and
collecting secret information about Daniel Ellsberg, Edward Kennedy,
and other "enemies '' 222 proceeded from fears for the administration's
political survival.223 To review such actions is to realize that an illicit
motive can unbalance the executive's assessment of the strength of the
government interests that must be weighed against the constitutional
rights of individuals.224
In addition to leading the President to overvalue the government's
interest, the role of executive places powerful pressures on the Presi-
dent that decrease the likelihood that he will accord sufficient weight to
tected, from dangers as they perceive them, but what happens is that pretty soon they exaggerate
the dangers .... " Electronic Surveillance within the United States for Foreign Intelligence Pur-
poses: Hearings on S. 3197 Before the Subcomm. on Intelligence and the Rights ofAmericans of the
Senate Select Comm on Intelligence, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Electronic
Surveillance Hearings].
220. See, e.g., Developments-National Security, supra note 136, at 1130, 1271 n.156 (1972)
("Testimony at recent hearings conducted by Senator Ervin into Army involvement in domestic
surveillance activities indicated that a military intelligence agent's assignment to infiltrate an or-
ganization whose purpose it was to coordinate young adult activities in Colorado Springs appar-
ently had been based wholly on the suspicion that members of the group might influence
servicemen against the Army in general and the Vietnam war in particular").
221. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
222. See text accompanying note 93 supra (discussing the break-in at the office of Ellsberg's
psychiatrist). See also J. LuKAs, supra note 49, at 16-17 (discussing surveillance of Kennedy and
related activities); id. 17-18 (discussing FBI investigation of reporter Daniel Schorr).
223. See, eg., R. NIXON, supra note 1, at 496 ("Sometimes I ordered a tail on a front-running
Democrat; sometimes I urged that department and agency fies be checked for any indications of
suspicious or illegal activities involving prominent Democrats. I told my staff that we should
come up with the kind of imaginative dirty tricks that our Democratic opponents used against us
and others so effectively in previous campaigns").
224. Although action taken for illegitimate political reasons may constitute an independent
first amendment violation, see note 203 supra, the possibility of such an illicit motive on the part
of the executive should also be taken into account in assessing whether the executive, acting with-
out statute, will reliably balance the legitimate governmental interest against other specific consti-
tutional interests-such as fourth amendment interests-in a proper initial balancing of the
respective interests. See text accompanying notes 232-35 infra.
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the value of protecting individual liberties. The executive frequently
acts as a manager, facing discrete problems that require prompt and
effective solutions. Very often the major focus of his actions and
thoughts is directed toward solving those immediate problems rather
than considering underlying questions of principle.225 One official, for
example, commented as follows on the operation of the White House
under Nixon's Chief of Staff, H.R. Haldeman:
The White House existed in a state of permanent crisis .... Hal-
deman contributed to the constant state of emergency by his admin-
istrative style. He never said, "Get me this by next week"; it was
always "Get me this by 3 P.M." Everything was important, every
detail, and the result was a highly charged atmosphere, one that en-
couraged a siege mentality.226
Such an atmosphere is clearly not conducive to the reflective considera-
tion of the risks to constitutional liberties posed by a course of action
that the President may think is crucial to achieving an important goal.
Furthermore, recent history emphasizes that when the executive
seeks to enforce the law or to gather intelligence-activities in which
risks to individual liberty are almost always present-a single-minded
concern for the perceived government interest has frequently en-
couraged disregard of the countervailing liberty interest. The remarks
of William Sullivan, former Assistant Director for Domestic Intelli-
gence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, appear to apply to a wide
range of executive activity in which serious risks to individual rights
were often ignored. Reflecting on years of illegal counter-intelligence
activities by the Bureau and other agencies, Sullivan remarked:
"[N]ever once did I hear anybody, including myself, raise the question:
'Is this course of action which we have agreed upon lawful, is it legal, is
it ethical or moral.' We never gave any thought to this line of reason-
ing, because we were just naturally pragmatic. '227 Regardless of how
225. "[Ulsually, of course, since the executive branch consists of people who are actively en-
gaged in doing something, they very rarely go to the question of assumptions." Executive Privilege
Hearings, supra note 9, at 467 (testimony of George Reedy).
226. J. MAGRUDER, supra note 206, at 72.
227. CHURCH REPORT, supra note 88, bk. II, at 14. See also id. 141. In the same vein, an
individual involved in the burglary of the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist remarked: "I see now
that the key is the effect that the term 'national security' had on my judgment. The very words
served to block critical analysis." N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1974, at 16, col. 6 (city ed.), quotedin Note,
supra note 101, at 990 n.59. For similar lack of concern about the legality of certain practices of
the Central Intelligence Agency, see the remarks of James Angleton, former chief of counter-
intelligence, in testimony before the Church Committee. Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm
to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to IntelligenceActivities, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., vol.
2, at 77 (1975). For many similar instances, see CHURCH REPORT, supra note 88, bk. II, at 140-41,
155-57. As the Church Committee put it, with respect to intelligence activities "[t]he question
raised was usually not whether a particular program was legal or ethical, but whether it worked."
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conscientious an executive official may be, the pressures to be "just nat-
urally pragmatic" can be overwhelming. The institutional preoccupa-
tions and hierarchical structure of executive agencies concerned with
law enforcement or intelligence tend to foster a state of mind in which
"national security" concerns are routinely considered vital and consid-
erations of individual liberty are correspondingly slighted.22 8 These
tendencies seem to be structural, rather than being confined to the igno-
rant or venal. As a Senate report stated, "Men entrusted with power,
even those aware of its dangers, tend, particularly when pressured, to
slight liberty. '229
B. Legislative Rulemaking and the Protection of Constitutional
Rights.
In light of these dangers to individual rights posed by executive
action without statute, we return to the importance of the requirement
of explicit lawmaking by Congress as a safeguard for individual rights.
As noted above, such a requirement has been suggested by language in
Id. 138. See also V. MARCHETTI & J. MARKS, THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE 249-50
(1974).
228. Again the testimony of James Angleton exemplifies this frame of mind. In the Church
Committee Hearings, Angleton testified as follows with respect to a Central Intelligence Agency
program of covert openings of mail which Angleton supervised from 1955 until the program was
discontinued in 1973:
Senator MONDALE: All right. What was your understanding of the legality of the
covert mail operation?
Mr. ANGLETON: That it was illegal.
Senator MONDALE: How do you rationalize conducting a program which you believe
to be illegal?
Mr. ANGLETON: ... From the counterintelligence point of view, we believe that it
was extremely important to know everything possible regarding contacts of American
citizens with Communist countries.
And second, that we believed that the security of the operation was such that the
Soviets were unaware of such a program and therefore that many of the interests that the
Soviets would have in the United States, subversive and otherwise, would be through the
open mails, when their own adjudication was that the mails could not be violated.
Senator MONDALE: So that a judgment was made, with which you concurred, that
although covert mail opening was illegal, the good that flowed from it, in terms of the
anticipating threats to this country through the use of this counterintelligence technique,
made it worthwhile nevertheless.
Mr. ANGLETON: That is correct.
Subsequently Mr. Angleton remarked, "I believe very much in a statement made by Director of
the FBI, Mr. Kelley, that it is his firm view ... that certain individual rights have to be sacrificed
for the national security." Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm., supra note 227, vol. 2, at 61-
62 (1975). For a wealth of detail on this point, see CHURCH REPORT, supra note 88, bk. 11, at 141-
46.
For litigation arising from the mail-opening program, see Birnbaum v. United States, 588
F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978) (awarding damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act to victims of the
program). For general commentary on Angleton and his role in the Central Intelligence Agency,
see W. COLBY & P. FORBATH, supra note 32, at 334-35.
229. CHURCH REPORT, supra note 88, bk. II, at 291.
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Supreme Court decisions, but the basis for this view has not been
clearly explained. 230 One possible justification for such a requirement
may be the importance of assuring that there is majority support for
action possibly infringing individual rights.23' But a more fundamental
justification is that structural differences between Congress and the ex-
ecutive necessitate legislative authorization prior to executive action
that might encroach on constitutional rights, in order to protect those
rights. Such a view rests on the position that constitutional rights are
likely to receive more careful and balanced protection when the execu-
tive must act pursuant to explicit congressional legislation than when
the executive is permitted to act without such legislation.
The protection of constitutional rights depends on the manner in
which a balance is struck or an accommodation is made between an
asserted government interest and the aspect of constitutional liberty in-
volved.232 Although the Supreme Court bears the ultimate responsibil-
ity for striking this balance, the Court is generally not equipped to
make the factual findings that may be required to probe the precise
strength of the government's asserted interest. This difficulty is particu-
larly marked when the Court must evaluate broad claims of paramount
national interest, particularly claims that the national security interest
justifies actions potentially infringing individual rights.233 The
problems in this area, however, are just a special instance of more gen-
eral limitations of judicial inquiry. As Justice Brennan stated in Ore-
230. See notes 192-97 supra and accompanying text.
231. When the executive acts without congressional authorization, the branch that is most
truly representative, according to traditional constitutional theory, has not indicated its assent.
See text accompanying notes 165-71 supra. Assurance that proposed government action accords
with the will of the majority is most needed, however, when that action potentially infringes indi-
vidual constitutional rights. There is little justification for a measure that potentially infringes
individual rights yet is not even likely to accord with majority will. Some commentators have
even suggested that courts should review the process of congressional lawmaking to assure that
potential constitutional problems have been fully considered and that the accommodation struck
is in fact "the product of a deliberate and broadly based political judgment." Sandalow, Judicial
Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1162, 1188 (1977). See also Linde, Due Process of
Lawmaking, 55 NFa. L. Ray. 197 (1976).
232. Such an accommodation is made even when the applicable technique of constitutional
interpretation marks out a category of protected activity, rather than balance the interests in each
case. See generally Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balanc-
ing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REy. 1482 (1975).
233. In fact, the evaluation of national security decisions is uncongenial to the judicial
process. Fact finding in secret, security clearances for lawyers, litigants, and perhaps
even judges, and the breadth and diversity of possible inquiry, all make for nonjusticia-
bility. Even if means can be jerrybuilt to produce a factual record, judges are in a poor
position to evaluate it.
Nesson, xspects ofthe Executive's Power Over National Security Matters: Secrecy Class/fcations
and Foreign Intelligence Wiretaps, 49 IND. L.J. 399, 400 (1974) (footnotes omitted).
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gon v. Mitchell,234 "The nature of the judicial process makes it an
inappropriate forum for the determination of complex factual ques-
tions of the kind so often involved in constitutional adjudication."
When the Court strikes down government action as violating a
specific guarantee, it determines that no plausible assessment of the
government interest is sufficient to override the liberty interest at issue.
When the Court upholds government action, however, it must as a
practical matter rely to some extent on the government's assertion that
its interest is strong enough to override an otherwise protected liberty
interest.
Although in such cases the Court cannot on its own fully evaluate
the strength of the government interest, it does not follow that the
Court must accept an initial assessment of the competing interests from
any government source. 235 Rather, to fulfill its role as guardian of indi-
vidual rights, the Court should require the government and liberty in-
terests to be initially balanced by the political branch most likely to be
able to evaluate the competing interests without bias or prejudice. That
branch is the Congress. The executive, as the special protector of the
government interest, is ordinarily not an appropriate forum for the ade-
quate initial balancing of government interests and individual rights.
Recent history emphasizes that there is substantial danger that the
executive will exaggerate the strength of the government interest and
diminish or disregard the value assigned to the liberty interest of the
individual. The legislative process, in contrast, provides opportunities
for more balanced assessment and protection of constitutional liber-
ties. 23 6 Lawmaking in general form tends to insulate lawmakers from
234. 400 U.S. 112, 247-48 (1970) (Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
235. Cf. C. BLAcK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 19-93 (1969):
['Activist' decisions of the Warren Court in criminal procedure seem] wholly justified,
not necessarily because every one of the [police] practices under review is evidently in-
trinsically wrong, but because due process of law ought to be held to require an active
judgment by the legislative branch, rather than by the police chief, on how much of our
personal liberty and security we must surrender in the interest of a practicable adminis-
tration of the criminal law ....
Id. 90. Compare Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 309-10 (1978) (Powell, J.)
(arguing that the State Board of Regents is not equipped to make findings of past discrimination
necessary to justify an affirmative action program that would otherwise violate equal protection),
with Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2785-87 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (unlike the
Board of Regents in Bakke, Congress is authorized to make such findings); f. Sager, Insular
Majorities Unabated- Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91
HARv. L. REv. 1373, 1414 (1978) (arguing that legislation by plebiscite should in certain circum-
stances be unconstitutional, even though the same measure might be upheld if passed by a legisla-
tive body, because "[1]egislation by plebiscite is not and cannot be a deliberative process").
236. In this respect the events of recent history confirm a traditional tenet of American consti-
tutional theory:
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the grossest forms of momentary or ad hoc passion. The generality of
legislative action is also conducive to consideration of policies and con-
stitutional principles free from the distractions of the individual case237
and with less likelihood of personal or institutional biases unduly
favoring the government interest. The necessity of articulating a rule in
general form and considering its applications encourages a focus on
relevant principles, including constitutional principles.238
In America, as in England, the conviction prevailed [in 1787] that the people must look
to representative assemblies for the protection of their liberties. And protection of the
individual, even if he be an official, from the arbitrary or capricious exercise of power
was then believed to be an essential of free government.
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 294-95 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654-55 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("The essence
of our free Government is 'leave to live by no man's leave, underneath the law'--to be governed
by those impersonal forces which we call law. . . . With all its defects, delays and inconve-
niences, men have discovered no technique for long preserving free government except that the
Executive be under the law, and that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations").
237. See text accompanying notes 202-210 supra.
238. Many members of Congress have always believed it their duty to evaluate and to weigh
government and liberty interests, whether or not the Supreme Court might find the legislation at
issue constitutional. For suggested principles to be used by a legislator in considering the question
of constitutionality, see Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation,
27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975). The constitutional questions considered in early Congresses are
discussed in D. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 45-70 (1966).
A particularly significant historical example of congressional balancing in the context of first
amendment rights--an example of particular importance for the decision of the Pentagon Papers
case-was the congressional consideration of the Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (1917)
(current version at 18 U.S.C. § 793-799 (1976)), enacted when the United States entered the First
World War. In considering the Act,
Congress engaged in its most important and extensive debate on freedom of speech and
the press since the Alien and Sedition Acts. The preoccupation was not academic. Con-
gressmen feared that President Wilson or his subordinates would impede, or even sup-
press, informed criticism of his Administration's war effort and foreign policy under the
guise of protecting military secrets.
Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 49, at 941. Congressional debates on the Act revealed substantial
concern about the possible infringement of first amendment rights that can result from penalizing
the disclosure or publication of defense information. This concern likely resulted from "solicitude
for freedom of the press or political anxiety about the powers of a war-time President .... " Id.
See also P. MURPHY, WORLD WAR I AND THE ORIGIN OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED
STATES 75-80 (1979).
In the Act, Congress excluded public dissemination of most forms of national-defense infor-
mation during peace time from the definitions of criminal offenses under the statute. Edgar &
Schmidt, supra note 49, at 943-44. Rejecting "a last-minute personal appeal by President Wilson,"
Congress also refused to enact a section that would have granted the President broad discretion to
censor domestic publications in time of war. Id. 944. Again, this measure, thought crucial by
President Wilson, was apparently defeated because Congress determined that the goals of military
security advanced by censorship did not outweigh the interests of freedom of the press. Id. 959,
1013. Strong opposition by the press was an important factor in the result. Id. 1013.
Congress's performance in this era, however, was far from fully protective of liberty interests.
For example, the 1917 Act contained provisions prohibiting willful obstruction of the recruiting
service and attempts to cause insubordination in the military, and excluding certain matter from
the mails. These provisions were applied to restrict certain forms of political speech. See Schenck
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Furthermore, Congress subsequently enacted the Espionage
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Unlike executive officers, members of Congress are not by their
very position placed in the role of identifying with and defending the
government interest as it confronts the individual. Legislators are thus
more likely to be skeptical of the government's exaggeration of its own
interest. If some members of Congress put forth exaggerated or idio-
syncratic fears of damage to the government interest, those fears may
be defused by the more level-headed views of others. In any event, the
reasonableness of those fears must be tested in public debate,239 where
they are subject to criticism by the press and the electorate as well as by
other members of Congress. Moreover, the very number of legislators
is likely to check action taken for clearly illegitimate purposes. Hostil-
ity or personal pique directed at specific enemies, often a highly subjec-
tive phenomenon, is much more likely to be an attribute of individual
action than of collegial action.240 Truly illicit plans cannot easily be
organized and maintained among large numbers of diverse personali-
ties representing far-flung interests.24'
Act of 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (repealed 1921), and other measures that imposed severe penalties
on certain forms of dissident speech. Seegenerall, P. MURPHY, supra, at 79-86; Z. CHAFEE, FREE
SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 38-42 (1941).
239. In addition to floor debate, which is almost always public, recent procedural changes
have opened almost all congressional committee meetings to the public. J. CHOPER, supra note 10,
at 34-35.
240. Although in rare instances Congress has passed statutes that impose burdens on named
individuals or groups, courts have ordinarily found such statutes unconstitutional as bills of at-
tainder. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965) (statute prohibiting members of the
Communist Party from becoming officers or employees of labor unions); United States v. Lovett,
328 U.S. 303 (1946) (statute denying compensation to three named government officials). But see
Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (upholding a statute requiring govern-
ment custody of the executive papers and recordings of President Nixon).
241. See THE FEDERALIST No. 55 (J. Madison), at 262 (1837 ed.) (although the legislature
should not be too large, "a certain number at least seems to be necessary to secure the benefits of
free consultation and discussion; and to guard against too easy a combination for improper pur-
poses ... ").
In the constitutional convention Madison made an analogous point with respect to the possi-
bility of executive corruption:
Besides the restraints of [the Legislators'] personal integrity & honor, the difficulty of
acting in concert for purposes of corruption was a security to the public. And if one or a
few members only should be seduced, the soundness of the remaining members, would
maintain the integrity and fidelity of the body. In the case of the Executive Magistracy
which was to be administered by a single man, loss of capacity or corruption was more
within the compass of probable events ....
2 M. FARRAND, supra note 166, at 66.
Barriers that might ordinarily exist in the executive bureaucracy against questionable execu-
tive action may be significantly reduced by a President like Nixon, who made substantial efforts to
make the bureaucracy responsive to political will and attempted to place the more permanent and
decentralized executive departments under the authority of presidential assistants not subject to
congressional confirmation. See note 7 supra. As Archibald Cox has remarked, "The power of
presidential aides is like that of royal courtiers. They are responsive, and responsible, to only one
man.' Cox, supra note 5, at 127.
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The legislature's deliberation also helps ensure the adequate as-
sessment of constitutional liberties.242 The decentralization and open-
ness of legislative procedure provides numerous opportunities for
public access, in committee hearings and otherwise, to the process of
deliberation.2 43 At the outset of the consideration of a particular meas-
ure, it may not be apparent that the measure exaggerates the govern-
ment interest or contains dangerous implications for constitutional
rights. The slowness of the legislative process, however, gives groups
and their representatives a chance to study the legislation, point out the
dangers, assemble public opinion, and educate the members of Con-
gress. The importance of time for education of this sort is crucial. The
opportunity for public education and careful analysis is often com-
pletely lacking with respect to executive action that may threaten the
constitutional rights of individuals, for executive action is not subject to
the inherent requirements of time-consuming deliberation.244
Finally, congressional procedure frequently allows a minority to
obstruct congressional action that may oppress individuals. The mi-
nority's ability to do this must be considered in light of the role of the
Bill of Rights, which largely protects individuals against the power of
the majority.245 When individual liberties are curtailed, that curtail-
ment often occurs because the majority wants the oppressive action to
be taken. In a government based on laws that are responsive to the
wishes of the majority, the Bill of Rights is essential to protect the liber-
ties of unpopular individuals against majority oppression. Although
the President is elected by a national constituency and may not find it
politically necessary to be particularly sensitive to the claims of small
or unpopular minorities, an individual senator or representative may
find it more important to respond to minority interests--either because
242. Deliberation is an attribute of congressional lawmaking that is acknowledged and forti-
fied by specific constitutional protection. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6 (speech and debate clause).
See also note 241 supra (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 55 (J. Madison) on the importance of "free
consultation and discussion" in Congress). In a different context one commentator has recently
argued that there may be a "federal right to initial legislative decision-making by an appropriate
deliberative entity." Sager, supra note 235, at 1415.
243. See, e.g., B. ECKHARDT & C. BLACK, THE TIDES OF POWER 130-38 (1976); L.
RIESELBACH, CONGRESSIONAL REFoRm IN THE 70s at 24 (1977).
244. The decision to seek an injunction against publication of the Pentagon Papers was made
in less than two days. See S. UNGAR, supra note 35, at 107-25. Even so, the Government argued
that the courts should defer to the executive's determination that the danger posed by revelation of
the documents justified imposition of a prior restraint. See text accompanying note 44supra. Cf.
Nesson, supra note 233, at 416 ("The Halperin [wiretap]. . . was requested, authorized, and in-
stalled all on the same day. Such speed was possible because no real justification had to be pre-
pared") (footnote omitted).
245. For a recent exposition of this point, see Oakes, supra note 36, at 915-17.
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the minorities are heavily represented in his constituency 246 or because
popular support for civil liberties in the constituency is unusually
strong.
In Congress, particularly in the Senate, a small group of members
desiring to stop a particular measure often has power beyond its num-
bers, especially when majority sentiment for the measure is not over-
whelming. This power may be exercised through the committee
system, the seniority of certain members, and even through such ordi-
narily questionable devices as the filibuster.24 7 These are techniques
that thwart the majority's will, but they may be viewed as legitimate
protective devices when used to defend constitutionally guaranteed lib-
erties.248 They permit the intensity of objection to bills potentially in-
fringing liberty to be registered in a system that may not always be able
through its electoral structure to reflect the intensity, in addition to the
breadth of support for a particular view.249
Although Congress has at times neglected its responsibility to con-
sider the implications of its legislation for constitutional liberty inter-
ests,250 several recent debates about issues raised during the Nixon
period illustrate Congress's inherent opportunity to assess carefully the
government and liberty interests implicated in a piece of legislation.
An important example is the continuing controversy over revision of
the Federal Criminal Code. Early proposals for a revised code were
introduced in Congress during the Nixon administration, and certain of
these proposals raised issues closely related to some of the important
constitutional problems of that era. In the Pentagon Papers case, as we
have seen, the executive, in the absence of a statute, unsuccessfully
claimed power to censor national-security information through judicial
action.251 Apparently in response to this and other failures to prevent
246. See, e.g., Burt, Miranda and Title I" A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 81,
107-09 (discussing the impact of Spanish-speaking residents on New York Senators' support for a
federal statute extending the franchise to certain Spanish-speaking citizens).
247. For a general discussion of these devices, see Choper, supra note 168, at 821-29. See also
R. LONGAKER, THE PRESIDENCY AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES 35-36 (1961); Sandalow, supra note
231, at 1192.
248. Cf. Bishin, Judicial Review in Democratic Theory, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 1099, 1131 (1977)
(arguing that democracy should be primarily viewed as concerned with preserving liberty and
only secondarily and derivatively viewed as embodying the concept of majority rule).
249. Cf. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 103 (1975) (viewing civil disobedience as a
legitimate device for registration of "intensity rather than numbers"). But see Ely, Constitutional
Interpreivisr " Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.. 399, 408 (1978) (discussing the ways in
which the electoral system itself registers intensity).
250. See, eg., D. MORGAN, supra note 238, at 246-68 (describing the passage of the Commu-
nist Control Act of 1954 as occurring in an atmosphere of "alarm and partisan strife," id. 265).
251. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). See text accompanying notes
33-59 supra.
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disclosure of classified material, the Nixon administration's proposed
code contained restrictions on the flow of certain government informa-
tion.252 The administration's bill and a successor proposal included a
provision resembling an "official secrets act," which would have made
it a criminal offense for past or present government employees to dis-
close a broad range of classified information to persons "not authorized
to receive it."253 Thus, this provision would have created a mechanism
to enforce the federal classification system, which lacks statutory en-
forcement authority except in narrow areas.254 Furthermore, the pro-
posed legislation expanded the definition of espionage so that the
publication of the Pentagon Papers might have been classified as espio-
nage punishable by imprisonment for thirty years.255
The Nixon administration and successor proposals evoked sus-
tained protest. The slowness of congressional action allowed time for
study of a document of hundreds of pages and enabled interested
252. The original Nixon administration bill was S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). It was
followed in the Ninety-fourth Congress by S. 1, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975), which incorporated
many portions of the earlier proposal. See generally Crystal, The Proposed Federal Criminal Jus-
tice ReformAct of 1975: A CiilLiberties Critique, 6 SETON HALL L. REV. 591, 592-94 (1975). See
also Murphy, Knowledge is Power: Foreign Policy and Information Interchange Among Congress,
the Executive Branch, and the Public, 49 TUL. L. REv. 505, 552-54 (1975).
253. S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1124 (1975) (disclosing classified information). Specifically,
section 1124 made it an offense for any person "being or having been in authorized possession or
control of classified information, or having obtained such information as a result of his being or
having been a federal public servant," to communicate "such information to a person who is not
authorized to receive it." Id. S. 1 set forth a cumbersome bureaucratic procedure which, if fol-
lowed, would have permitted a defendant to raise the defense that the material in question had
been improperly classified; S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), see note 252 supra, permitted no
such defense. For analysis of this proposed section, see Crystal, supra note 252, at 607-13. See
also Nesson, A Step Toward an Autocratic State, TRIAL, Sept.-Oct., 1973, at 27, 30 (discussing S.
1400); Comment, CivilLiberties and National Security: 4 Delicate Balance, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 922,
935-41 (1973) (discussing S. 1400).
254. For example, present law penalizes certain disclosures of classified information by a gov-
ernment employee to a foreign agent or member of a "Communist organization," 50 U.S.C.
§ 783(b) (1976), and certain disclosures of classified information relating to codes or code-break-
ing activity, 18 U.S.C. § 798 (1976). See also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A) (1976) (excluding "properly"
classified information from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act); 42 U.S.C. § 2271
(1976) ("Restricted Data" relating to atomic energy).
255. The proposed espionage provision would, among other things, have penalized a person
who, "knowing that national defense information may be used to the prejudice of the safety or
interest of the United States, or to the advantage of a foreign power . . . communicates such
information to a foreign power. ... S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1121(a) (1975). The proposal
defined "communicate" in a manner designed to include newspaper publication: "to impart or
transfer information, or otherwise to make information available by any means, to a person or to
the general public." Id. § 11; see Crystal, supra note 252 at 602-05.
On the breadth of the administration's proposals, see generally Edgar & Schmidt, supra note
49, at 1083: "The consequence of S. 1400's enactment would be to prohibit virtually all public and
private speech about national defense secrets, leaving to prosecutors and juries to choose victims
among those who engage in reporting and criticism of our defense and foreign policies."
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groups to detect and publicize the measures that potentially threatened
constitutional liberties in this massive proposal. Ultimately, Congress
rejected these proposals, largely because of fears that they might en-
danger liberty of the press. 256 After substantial reworking, the Senate
passed a version of the criminal code revision during the 95th Con-
gress, but the House did not vote on the measure. 257 Revised versions
of the proposed code were again introduced in the 96th Congress and
again failed.258 The drafters of these more recent proposals have omit-
ted the official-secrets provision and the expanded definition of espio-
nage proposed by the Nixon administration. Whether or not the Nixon
proposals would have been held unconstitutional by the Court, it is
significant that they were omitted in Congress because of their threat to
individual liberties, either because members of Congress doubted their
constitutionality or because they were thought to be too hazardous to
the liberty interest, even if constitutional.259
A second recent example of congressional balancing of the govern-
ment and liberty interests, also related to problems of the Nixon period,
is found in the progress of the bills that evolved into the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act of 1978.260 After President Nixon's resignation,
both the Ford and Carter administrations asserted that the executive
was empowered to engage in electronic surveillance without judicial
256. See, e.g., Mullen, The Proposed Criminal Code and the Press, 47 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
502, 505 (1979) ("[O]pposition by the press to the proposed espionage offenses was the principal
reason for the failure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary to consider the proposed Code in
the Ninety-fourth Congress"); id. 522 ("Controversy over the Code's effect on the press was
largely responsible for delaying action on the Code in the Ninety-fourth and Ninety-fifth Con-
gresses").
257. S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); see Mullen, supra note 256, at 502 n.3.
258. See Mullen, supra note 256, at 502 n.3. The Senate bill was S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979). The House bill was H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
259. Nevertheless, subsequent proposals for a federal criminal code retained other provisions
that may endanger individual rights; consequently, vigorous debate over these proposals has con-
tinued. See, e.g., Legislation to Revise and Recodify Federal Criminal Laws.: Hearings on H.R.
6869 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice ofthe House Comm. of the Judiciary, 95th Cong.,
Ist & 2d Sess. 1190-1211 (1977-1978) (statement of representatives of the American Civil Liberties
Union criticizing provisions of the proposed code). See generaly Schwartz, Reform of the Federal
Criminal Laws: Issues, Tactics, and Prospects, LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Winter, 1977, at 1.
Whether or not such provisions are ultimately enacted, they will have been subjected to the public
scrutiny and evaluation that often characterizes legislative action but is frequently absent from
executive attempts to make policy impinging on the constitutional rights of individuals.
260. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511,
2518, 2519 (Supp. III 1979)). See generally Shapiro, supra note 88; Note, Criminal Procedure-
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of1978: A New Charterfor Electronic Intelligence Gathering,
58 N.C. L. REv. 171 (1979).
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warrant or legislative authorization in foreign-intelligence cases.2 61 In
1977 the Senate considered legislation to regulate this form of activ-
ity.2 6 2 The Carter administration had collaborated in preparing the
proposed Senate bill and strongly supported the measure.263 Although
the Senate bill required a judicial warrant for most foreign-intelligence
wiretapping, controversy surrounded the minimal showing that would
be demanded of the executive to obtain a warrant. The proposed legis-
lation did not require that a judge find probable cause to believe that
the surveillance would lead to information about a crime, 264 though
such a finding is ordinarily required to obtain a warrant for electronic
surveillance when national security is not at issue.2 65
Throughout committee hearings senators and others who feared
dilution of fourth amendment rights criticized the proposed legislation
for permitting the executive to undertake surveillance when no viola-
tion of law appeared likely.2 66 Although Attorney General Griffin Bell
and the Justice Department argued vigorously for this standard in the
Senate bill,267 they offered no persuasive justification for the absence of
the usual "criminal standard. '268 In light of the administration's in-
ability to explain the need for the less restrictive test, the Senate
261. See text accompanying notes 103-04 supra. See also Pear, US. Offieials Defne Policy on
Searches, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1980, § 1, at 34, col. 1 (the Carter administration reaffirms its
authority to act without a warrant in foreign national-security cases).
262. S. 1566, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. §§ 2521-2525 (1977) (version of May 18, 1977), reprinted in
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1977, Hearings on S. 1566 Before the Subcomr. on Crimi-
nalLaws andProcedures of the Senate Comnm on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 142-50 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 1566]. For the history of earlier legislative proposals directed
toward similar ends, see A. THEOHARIS, SPYING ON AMERICANS 117-19 (1978); Shapiro, supra
note 88, at 120-24.
263. Shapiro, supra note 88, at 124; see Hearings on S, 1566, supra note 262, at 34-38, 42-46.
264. See S. 1566, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2521(b)(2)(B)(iii), 2525(a)(3) (1977) (version of May
18, 1977), reprinted in Hearings on S. 1566, supra note 262, at 134, 146.
265. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1976). Cf. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967) (fourth
amendment probable cause ordinarily requires belief that "an offense has been or is being com-
mitted").
266. Hearings on S. 1566, supra note 262, at 21-24, 35-38, 42-43 (questioning of Attorney Gen-
eral Bell and FBI Director Kelley by Senators Kennedy and Abourezk); id. 61-62, 66 (questioning
of CIA Director Turner and Secretary of Defense Brown by Senator Kennedy); id. 74-82 (state-
ment of John Shattuck); id. 85-87, 89-91, 96-97, 99-100 (statement of Morton H. Halperin); id.
102-03 (statement of Esther Herst).
The absence of a "criminal standard" for surveillance had also been a focus of debate on a
predecessor bill, S. 3197, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), in the Ninety-fourth Congress. Electronic
Surveillance Hearings, supra note 219, at 52-70 (1976) (statement and testimony of Walter F.
Mondale); id. 93-95 (questioning of Attorney General Levi by Senator Bayh); id. 118 (testimony
of Robert F. Drinan); id. 129-31 (testimony of Aryeh Neier); id. 166, 172 (testimony of Herman
Schwartz).
267. Hearings on S. 1566, supra note 262, at 34-38, 42-46. See also id. 8-10.
268. See Shapiro, supra note 88, at 150-65.
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adopted an amended version of the bill requiring that for most foreign-
intelligence surveillance of American citizens and resident aliens, the
executive must show probable cause to believe that the target of the
surveillance has committed or is about to commit a crime (or, in the
case of certain intelligence-gathering activities, that those activities in-
volve or may involve a criminal offense).269 With respect to such "U.S.
persons," this standard approaches the probable-cause standard appli-
cable in ordinary criminal investigations.270 The Senate provisions set-
ting forth the more restrictive "criminal" standard were substantially
included in the legislation as ultimately enacted.27'
The history of this legislation exemplifies the predisposition of ex-
ecutive officers to favor the supposed national-security interest over in-
dividual rights and their tendency not to analyze carefully whether
particular rules that might infringe the constitutional rights of individu-
als are necessary to accomplish the government's purpose. Similarly,
the history presents an excellent example of congressional testing of the
executive's national-security claims and the ultimate rejection of an im-
portant part of the executive's position as untenable. The result was
quite probably a more objective weighing of the government and lib-
erty interests and, in this case, movement toward the protection of
fourth amendment values.272 It is this type of careful testing by public
legislative debate that should be required whenever the executive seeks
to take action in an area that may involve the infringement of constitu-
tional rights.273
269. S. 1566, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 2521(b)(2)-(4), 2525(a)(3), 124 CONG. REc. S6014, 56016
(daily ed. Apr. 20, 1978).
270. See Note, supra note 260, at 180-8 1. No showing of a possible criminal violation is neces-
sary, however, for electronic surveillance of certain foreign government groups, S. 1566, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 2521(b)(1), 124 CONG. REC. S6014 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1978), or certain foreign
persons acting on behalf of a foreign government, id. § 2521(b)(2)(A), 124 CONG. REC. S6014
(daily ed. Apr. 20, 1978). Fourth amendment and due process problems are thus raised by the
treatment of certain foreign government groups and foreign persons in accordance with a less
protective standard. See generally Shapiro, supra note 88, at 167-80 (1978). Additional issues are
raised by the application of the less stringent standard to foreign or domestic entities that are
"directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments." S. 1566, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 2521(b)(1)(F), 124 CONG. REC. S6014 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1978).
271. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(b)-(d), 1805(a)(3) (Supp. 11 1978).
272. The statute as enacted also provides for various special problems. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C.
§ 1805(e) (Supp. 111978) (emergency orders); id. § 1805(0 (testing of equipment). Whether or not
one agrees with the manner in which the balance is ultimately struck in each category, the statute
reveals a careful attempt to adjust the of government and liberty interests.
But see Hentoff, Secret Crimes, Secret Courts, and the Complicity ofthe A CL U, Village Voice,
Mar. 24, 1980, at 30-31 (arguing that the safeguards of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
are inadequate).
273. Congress has limited other assertions of the government security interest advanced by the
executive during the Nixon period. For example, Congress amended the Freedom of Information
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V. THE REQUIREMENT OF EXPLICIT CONGRESSIONAL
AUTHORIZATION
The above discussion leads to the conclusion that when executive
action threatens constitutionally protected rights, the action should or-
dinarily be found unconstitutional on separation-of-powers grounds if
not clearly and explicitly authorized by Congress. The Court should
strike down executive action that may threaten individual rights when
Congress has not explicitly authorized such action, even if with con-
gressional authorization the Court might find the action constitu-
tional.274 This analysis would assure the protection of congressional
balancing when individual rights are at stake.275
To a certain extent, the goal of protecting constitutional rights by
requiring legislative authorization of executive action may be achieved
through a stringent application of the "clear statement" doctrine. In
criminal law this doctrine requires that ambiguous or vague statutes be
construed narrowly to avoid applications that might infringe constitu-
tional liberties. In administrative law the doctrine mandates that dele-
gations of authority possibly infringing on constitutional rights be
made in the clearest possible terms.276 In either area the Court should
not find that Congress has considered, and thus approved, a possible
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976), to limit the absolute exemption for classified information established
by the Supreme Court in EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973). See generally Clark, supra note 204.
Also of interest is the response of Congress to section 509 of the proposed Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. As proposed by the Supreme Court, the rule contained evidentiary privileges insulating
the government from the disclosure of a "secret of state" or other "official information" in the
course of litigation. FED. R. EvID. 509 (Sup. Ct. version), reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 251-52
(1972). Pressure from the Justice Department, then under Richard Kleindienst, apparently played
an important role in the broadening of the proposed government privilege for state secrets and in
the insertion of the privilege for official information. See 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEIN-
STEIN'S EVIDENCE 509-4, 509-5 (1979). As President Nixon was contemporaneously asserting
analogous claims of executive secrecy in investigations relating to the Watergate affair, the pro-
posed government privileges were subjected to sharp attack in congressional hearings and else-
where. See Berger, supra note 136, at 775-80. Ultimately, after intense debate, Congress deleted
all of the provisions in the proposed Federal Rules creating specific privileges.
274. Professor Junger derives a similar proposition from the opinions in the Pentagon Papers
and Steel Seizure cases: "The doctrine of the separation of powers denies the Executive the consti-
tutional power to take action on his own authority if that action is one which would be of doubtful
constitutionality had it been authorized by Congress." Junger, supra note 50, at 38 (emphasis
omitted). His approach to the problem, however, and his justifications for the principle derived
from those cases are quite different from the approach and underlying principles suggested here.
275. Although this view emphasizes the opportunities for protection of constitutional rights
that are present in congressional deliberation, adoption of the position suggested here certainly
does not imply that all action taken pursuant to explicit congressional authorization is constitu-
tional. If the Court finds the executive action to be specifically authorized by statute, the Court
must then proceed in the customary manner to subject to rigorous judicial scrutiny the congres-
sional lawmaking that threatens to encroach upon constitutional rights.
276. See note 192 supra and accompanying text.
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deprivation of constitutional liberties without specific statutory lan-
guage so indicating. Without such an assurance it is not clear that the
safeguards of the legislative process, described above, have been ap-
plied to the potential constitutional infringement at issue.277 The "clear
statement" doctrine, therefore, is properly viewed not simply as an as-
pect of the judicial policy of avoiding constitutional questions unless
absolutely necessary, but primarily as an aspect of the protection of
individual rights that is implicit in the requirement of congressional,
rather than executive, lawmaking.278
In addition, the doctrine of inherent executive powers should ordi-
narily have no role when the executive seeks, in the absence of statute,
to impose burdens on individuals that might infringe on their constitu-
tional rights.279 Thus in the Pentagon Papers case, 280 the Court should
have discussed the first amendment issue only to show that granting an
injunction posed possible constitutional problems. Once the possibility
of a first amendment violation became clear, the Court should have
denied the injunction because Congress had not specifically authorized
a prior restraint of speech in such circumstances. In resolving the case
on this ground, the Court need not decide whether an injunction would
be constitutional if congressional authority were present. 28' Similarly,
prior to the passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
277. Cf. A. BICIEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 181-82 (1962) ("Legislators are likely to
be more acutely aware of just what they are being asked to do if the language of a bill clearly
defines what is aimed at than if the language is relatively broad . . ."). Moreover, without a
requirement of a clear congressional statement, the executive has too much opportunity to act
arbitrarily. If the executive is permitted to interpret an ambiguous statute to cover the specific
type of activity involved, he makes law for the particular case, and that executive action increases
the danger that individuals will be penalized arbitrarily or on the basis of political or personal
hostility. Consequently, if the executive acts under a vague statute in an atmosphere of political
hostility, that action raises many of the issues presented by executive action without a statute,
discussed in section IV(A)(2) above. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974) ("Statu-
tory language of such a standardless sweep allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue
their personal predilections"). See note 210 supra. See also Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,
405 U.S. 156 (1972).
278. See note 232 supra and accompanying text.
279. It has been asserted that there is an area of possible concurrent power, in which the
President might ordinarily act alone if Congress has not yet acted in an inconsistent manner.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). The
analysis presented here would deny the President the power to act in that area in a manner that
might threaten constitutional rights without explicit congressional authorization.
The requirement of prior congressional authorization proposed here could not logically be
applied, however, in the very narrow class of cases in which the President is empowered to act and
Congress is constitutionally barred from acting. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 637-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
280. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
281. For a similar argument in the Pentagon Papers litigation, see DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 38, at 624-27 (argument of Alexander Bickel for the New York Times in district court).
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1978,282 the Court should have found foreign national-security wiretap-
ping in the United States unconstitutional because it threatened fourth
amendment-and in some instances first amendment-interests and
lacked clear statutory authorization. Now that Congress has passed a
statute authorizing and regulating foreign national security wiretap-
ping,283 it may become necessary for the Court to review wiretaps im-
posed in accordance with the statute to determine whether they comply
with the fourth amendment. In the absence of such a statute, however,
it should not have been necessary for a court to reach the underlying
fourth amendment issue.284
Although some decisions of the Supreme Court are consistent with
the foregoing analysis,2 85 others deviate from this position. A line of
recent Court decisions, for example, has upheld intrusive executive ac-
tivity potentially infringing on fourth amendment interests, even
though the measures in question were not clearly authorized by stat-
ute.28 6 The analysis proposed here also casts serious doubt on the re-
sult in Snepp v. United States,28 7 in which the Supreme Court imposed
a constructive trust on the profits of a book published by a former Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent without the agency's permission.
To illustrate the impact of the position urged here on contemporary
doctrine, it is useful to conclude with a discussion of this decision.
The defendant in Snepp had participated in the American with-
drawal from South Vietnam in 1975, and he subsequently published a
282. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (Supp. III 1979)).
283. See text accompanying notes 260-71 supra.
284. Similarly, under the theory of this article, Army surveillance of the public political activ-
ity of individuals is unconstitutional because it threatens first and fourth amendment interests
without explicit statutory authority. Under Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972), however, an indi-
vidual who seeks to challenge such surveillance on constitutional grounds does not present a justi-
ciable controversy in the federal courts. See text accompanying notes 126-31 supra. Becase Laird
v. Ta/ur does not clearly state that an article III "case or controversy" is lacking, however, Con-
gress may have the power to grant standing to persons aggrieved by the collection of data relating
to their public political speech. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 131-33 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing). For statutory limitations on political intelligence-gathering, enacted to curb abuses of the
sort described in Laird v. Tatur, see Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7), (g) (1976).
285. See note 192 supra and accompanying text.
286. See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979) (covert entry to install an electronic
eavesdropping device); United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977) (an order
that a third party cooperate in the installation of a pen register); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S.
606 (1977) (opening of international mail without a search warrant); Sf. United States v. Euge, 444
U.S. 707 (1980) (compelled execution of handwriting exemplars). In his dissent in Dalia, Justice
Stevens remarked that before deciding "serious constitutional issues" the Court should require
"unambiguous" congressional authorization. "Without a legislative mandate that is both explicit"
and specific, I would presume that this flagrant invasion of the citizen's privacy is prohibited."
441 U.S. at 279 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
287. 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam).
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book expressing his view that many Vietnamese adherents of the
agency had been unjustifiably abandoned in the withdrawal.288 Al-
though Snepp, like other agents, had signed a secrecy agreement re-
quiring him to submit manuscripts based on information acquired
while he was an agency employee to the agency for clearance before
publication, Snepp failed to seek clearance.2 89 The United States sued
Snepp for damages and the imposition of a trust on profits, asserting
that publication of the book without prior clearance violated the se-
crecy agreement and a fiduciary duty of employees, including govern-
ment employees, to respect the confidences of their employers.
290
As in the Pentagon Papers case, there were two constitutional is-
sues. First, Snepp claimed a first amendment right to publish the book
without prior clearance and argued that any waiver of this right in the
secrecy agreement was invalid under the first amendment. As in the
Pentagon Papers case, however, there was a second issue that was not
primarily stressed yet might be considered more fundamental. Al-
though the Government's action against Snepp potentially affected his
first amendment rights, it was undertaken without explicit statutory au-
thority. Congress has not explicitly authorized contracts indefinitely
limiting the right of former CIA agents to publish material about their
experiences in the agency; nor has Congress created an employee's
fiduciary duty that might severely limit the exercise of first amendment
rights. The National Security Act of 1947 obliges the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence to take measures to protect "intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure," 291 but this statute, which could
be read as directed to internal agency procedures, is far from an explicit
288. F. SNEPP, DECENT INTERVAL (1977).
289. Snepp apparently took active steps to conceal from the Central Intelligence Agency that
publication of the volume was imminent. United States v. Snepp, 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (E.D. Va.
1978), aI'dinpart & rev'd in part, 595 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1979), rey'd in part, 444 U.S. 507 (1980)
(per curiam) (reinstating district court's judgment). Publication without clearance by the agency
was also alleged to violate a "termination secrecy agreement" Snepp signed when he resigned
from the agency. See 595 F.2d at 930 n.2.
290. Because the book was actually in print before the agency knew that publication was im-
minent, the agency was unable to seek an injunction against the publication of the book, a course
it had successfully pursued in an earlier instance. See United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
After the Supreme Court decision in Snepp, the Government filed a similar action against
John R. Stockwell, a former CIA agent who published a book describing the agency's actions in
Angola without prior submission of the manuscript to the agency. Third Ex-C.LA. Agent Sued by
U.S.for Profits, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1980, § A, at 13, col. 4. The government has also sought to
recover profits of books published by Philip Agee, another former agent whose manuscripts were
not submitted to the CIA for review. Judge Rules that U.S. Can Continue Its Suit For Agee Book
Profits, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1980, § B, at 9, col. 6.
291. 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1976).
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authorization of a comprehensive contract requiring all former agents
to submit proposed publications to the agency with sanctions to be en-
forced in the federal courts. Nor, of course, does the statute specifically
authorize such extraordinary contract remedies as a prior restraint of
publication or an imposition of a constructive trust on profits resulting
from publication. 292
The lower courts largely skirted the first amendment and statutory
issues and concentrated instead on narrower questions of contract and
fiduciary law and the nature of the appropriate remedy.2 93 Similarly,
in holding for the Government, the Supreme Court rejected in a cur-
sory footnote the arguments that enforcement of the contract violated
the first amendment and that there was no statutory authority for the
agreement.294 Instead, the per curiam opinion found that Snepp had
breached a fiduciary obligation to the agency, and concluded that a
constructive trust should be imposed on all profits derived by Snepp
from the publication. The Court also approved an injunction prohibit-
ing Snepp from publishing other material about the agency without
prior submission for review.295
292. In contrast, in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2277, 2280 (1976), Congress
explicitly authorized an injunction against certain disclosures of information relating to atomic
energy.
293. The district court found that Snepp had "willfully, deliberately and surreptitiously
breached his position of trust with the CIA and the secrecy agreement." United States v. Snepp,
456 F. Supp. at 179. The court accordingly imposed a constructive trust for the benefit of the
government over all profits Snepp derived from the book. Id. at 182. The district court also
ordered Snepp not to publish any further information about the CIA without prior approval of the
agency if the information was obtained during the course of his employment. Id. at 182.
The court of appeals reversed the district court in part. United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926
(4th Cir. 1979), rev"dinpart, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam). The court held that Snepp's action,
though a breach of contract, did not violate his fiduciary duty to the agency. Consequently, the
imposition of a constructive trust was held to be improper. 595 F.2d at 935-36. The court found,
however, that the government was entitled at least to nominal damages for breach of contract, and
remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings to determine whether compensatory
or punitive damages were appropriate. Id. at 936-38.
294. See 444 U.S. at 509 n.3. The somewhat fragmentary nature of the per curiam opinion
might be explained by the fact that, in an extraordinary action, the Court granted the defendant's
petition for certiorari and the government's cross petition and issued its judgment in the case
without hearing oral argument or receiving full briefs on the issues involved. See id. at 524-25
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
295. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens (joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall) ar-
gued that the Court's imposition of a constructive trust was "not supported by statute, by the
contract, or by the common law." Id. at 517. The basis for his argument was that, as the Govern-
ment conceded for the purposes of the litigation, Snepp had not published any classified informa-
tion in his book. Id. at 517-23. Stevens also argued that because a secrecy agreement is a prior
restraint on speech, "an especially heavy burden [is imposed] on the censor to justify the remedy it
seeks." Id. at 526.
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This result, which allows severe burdens on potential first amend-
ment interests without explicit legislative authorization, violates the
principles discussed above. To enforce the executive's secrecy agree-
ment risks the restriction of first amendment interests through biased
government balancing. The policy embodied in the secrecy agreement
was apparently established by the CIA, an agency that represents the
government in highly adversarial settings and that, as recent history
shows, has routinely ignored liberty interests.296 Consequently, there is
an undue risk that when the CIA framed the agreement, it overvalued
the government interest and gave insufficient weight to the first amend-
ment interests of the agent and the public.297 The first amendment in-
terests might suggest, for example, that even if the agency must approve
some manuscripts before publication, prohibition of publication should
be limited to particularly dangerous types of classified information for
specified periods after classification, or that the entire requirement of
prepublication review should be limited to a defined period following
the termination of the agent's employment. 298 Such interests might
also suggest that manuscripts should be reviewed by an independent
board rather than by the agency. 299 The point is not that the Constitu-
tion necessarily requires any of these particular, less intrusive solutions,
but that when an executive agency whose own interests are implicated
makes an accommodation between government interests and constitu-
296. See notes 227-28 supra and accompanying text.
297. For a discussion of CIA secrecy agreements and the public's first amendment interest in
the receipt of information, see Comment, National Security and the First Amendment: The CIA in
the Marketplace of Ideas, 14 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 655, 682-85, 702-03 (1979). See generally
Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. I.
The argument that the public has a strong first amendment interest in informed criticism of
the agency and, more generally, in a broad range of information about what the agency is doing, is
not always likely to receive very careful or sympathetic consideration within the agency itself.
Similarly, that much information is routinely over-classified is not likely to be enthusiastically
considered by an agency that may itself be responsible for substantial amounts of over-classifica-
tion. Cf. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir.) (an initial assertion of classified
status for information that was ultimately acknowledged to be publishable), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
992 (1975); Nesson, supra note 233, at 402-06 (detailed analysis of the tendency toward overclas-
sification).
298. The breadth of the CIA secrecy agreement may be contrasted, for example, with the
careful balancing of interests by Congress that is evident in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2518, 2519, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (Supp. III 1979). In enacting
this statute Congress attempted, with information and comment from numerous sources represent-
ing the government and liberty interests, to accommodate the respective weights of these interests
in various circumstances. See notes 260-71 supra and accompanying text. For a recent attempt by
the Justice Department to define the circumstances in which CIA secrecy agreements win be en-
forced, see Department of Justice Press Release, Attorney General's Guidelines for Litigation to
Enforce Obligations to Submit Materials for Predissemination Review (December 12, 1980).
299. See Independent Censor Is Opposed by C...A., N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1980, § A, at 18, col.
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tional rights, there is undue danger that the balance it strikes will be
improperly distorted in favor of the governmental interest.3°° More-
over, agency promulgation of such a rule raises the danger of the influ-
ence of an illegitimate interest. The CIA may have sought to further
not only the legitimate interest of preserving the confidentiality of intel-
ligence information, but also the illegitimate desire to protect itself
from a form of political attack that may be particularly powerful be-
cause its source is one of the agency's former employees.301
If a court were to rely on the agency's balancing of interests, it
could not be sure that a fair initial assessment of the government and
liberty interests had been presented to it. The agency can offer only a
secretive and highly self-interested decision about what the government
interest requires. In consequence, absent a clear legislative determina-
tion about contractual restrictions on publication for former CIA em-
ployees, a court should not reach the question of whether a particular
contractual rule unduly infringes on first amendment rights. Rather, in
accordance with the principles set forth above, a court should require
an explicit congressional authorization of such a contract and deny en-
forcement of any such contract set down by the executive alone in the
absence of specific legislation.302
300. The judiciary's lack of expertise or opportunity for full factual investigation, however,
makes it unable to weigh these interests with the care and in the detail possible in legislative
consideration. Although a court can recognize that the government interest in this area is impor-
tant, it cannot fully evaluate how important certain types of secrecy are to the conduct of foreign
affairs. The court is therefore likely either to strike down the regulation in accordance with some
general constitutional rule or, as in Snepp, to uphold the regulation on the basis of the govern-
ment's (here, the executive's) assertion of the strength of its own interest. Since determining the
precise weight of the government's interest is crucial when government action is upheld against a
plausible liberty claim, the initial determination should be made not by the executive branch in
accordance with its own interest, but rather by Congress in the form of rules that are likely to
reflect a more disinterested and careful weighing of the government interest against the liberty
interest in specific categories. See text accompanying notes 230-73 supra.
301. Such an illegitimate interest might encourage an absolute rule of review and a flat rule
prohibiting disclosure of all classified information, as opposed to a more narrowly drawn rule
designed to protect against disclosure of only the most important types of classified information.
Such an interest might also lead the agency to take an inflexible stand against review by an in-
dependent board rather than by the agency itself.
302. The recent case of Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C.), ajf'd sub nom. Agee v.
Muskie, 629 F.2d 80 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 69 (1980) (No. 80-83), raises issues
similar to those discussed above. In 1975 Philip Agee, a former CIA agent, published a book
describing CIA activities in Central and South America and disclosing the names of many alleged
agents. P. AGEE, INSIDE THE COMPANY: CIA DIARY (1975). Later Agee co-authored similar
books about the agency's activities in Europe and Africa. In 1979, after it was rumored that Agee
had been invited to participate in an international tribunal relating to the Americans held hostage
in Iran, the State Department withdrew Agee's passport. Plea by Ex-C.IA. Agent to Restore Pass-
port is Denied, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1980, § A, at 6, col. 4. The State Department based its action
on a regulation purporting to authorize denial of a passport to anyone whose "activities abroad
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VI. CONCLUSION
It is appropriately the function of courts to ensure that the execu-
tive does not act in areas of potential constitutional concern without
explicit legislative authority. In enforcing this doctrine the courts are
not primarily vindicating an interest held by Congress in opposition to
the executive. Nor is the doctrine primarily a judicial technique to
avoid difficult or intrusive constitutional questions. Rather, in prevent-
ing the executive from threatening protected areas in the absence of
explicit legislative rules, the Court is exercising its traditional function
as protector of the specific constitutional rights of individuals. By re-
quiring explicit legislation before the executive can take action that
threatens individual liberty, the Court enforces a constitutional safe-
guard that is important in vindicating the interests protected by the Bill
of Rights.
are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national security or the foreign policy of
the United States." 22 C.F.R. §§ 51.70(b)(4), 51.71(a) (1980). This regulation, in turn, was said to
be authorized by a statute stating that "[t]he Secretary of State may grant and issue passports . .
under such rules as the President shall designate and prescribe. ... 22 U.S.C. § 21 Ia (Supp. II
1978). Because the statutory language does not explicitly authorize the regulation, the Secretary
argued "that a long-standing historical practice involving passport denials based on national se-
curity and foreign policy interests exists, and that this historical practice, unquestioned by Con-
gress, confirms the validity of the regulation." Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. at 73 1.
Because the statute and the regulation were drawn in broad terms, there were no clear guide-
lines set forth in advance to channel the exercise of executive action. The withdrawal of Agee's
passport, therefore, is an example of executive action directed against the arguably protected con-
stitutional interests of a specific individual without any clear rule set down in advance. Conse-
quently, because the relevant policy and its application in the specific case are made
simultaneously, the case presents dangers of the overestimation of the governmental interest influ-
enced by the presence of an offensive individual, and also the possible implementation of illicit
desires to punish political views of the individual in question. Cf. Agee v. CIA, 500 F. Supp. 506
(D.D.C. 1980) (acknowledging, in a separate litigation, that a substantial issue is raised by Agee's
allegation that the CIA secrecy agreement has been discriminatorily enforced against speech unfa-
vorable to the agency). In contrast, a more neutral determination of general policy in the abstract
is likely to be present in an explicit congressional rule. See note 277 supra and text accompanying
notes 198-210 supra. Furthermore, the lack of clear legislative determination on this issue denies
Agee an initial policy determination, by a body more likely to exercise disinterested judgment, on
whether the withdrawal of a passport is a justifiable infringement on liberty in response to fears of
injury to the national-security and foreign-policy interests asserted by the Secretary. Because the
executive itself is the focus of Age's attack, it is less likely to weigh the government and liberty
interests in an even-handed manner. See text accompanying notes 203, 211-29 supra. The district
court ordered the Secretary to restore Age's passport, finding that the withdrawal was not author-
ized by statute. 483 F. Supp. at 731-32. The court of appeals affirmed this judgment. Agee v.
Muskie, 629 F.2d 80 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 69 (1980) (No. 80-83).
